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Abstract
High levels of either public debt or wealth inequality are detrimental to social and
economic stability. At a time when reducing public debt and decreasing wealth inequality
have become important policy priorities, the question arises about whether these two
goals stand in conflict. With this in mind, Chapter 1 assesses the effects of public debt
on wealth inequality based on an analytically tractable model of heterogeneous agents.
Its scope, in particular, is to investigate whether a reduction of public debt or of budget
deficits in general might amplify or not the levels of wealth inequality. In answering this
question, we explore a novel channel where, for example, a reduction in budget deficits
amplifies wealth inequality due to the change in factor prices, and in particular that of
interest rates. Therefore, and besides that our research is the first to explore this type of
question, our main contribution is that we show how a change in public debt can affect
wealth inequality in an implicit way through the change in factor incomes - that is, the
general equilibrium effects.
In Chapter 2, on the other hand, we study the design of policies within an en-
dogenous growth model of incomplete markets and partial commitment. Markets are
incomplete in two dimensions, the government cannot insure itself from the presence of
aggregate risk, and the accumulation of human capital is subject to idiosyncratic risk.
Our primary contribution highlights the importance of human capital to effectively man-
age the economy along the cycle. More specifically, we make a novel argument: taking
short run risks are effective responses to a shock that might depress the economy. An
investment in human capital which is subject to idiosyncratic risk, serves that purpose.
Its returns however, must be protected over-time through an effective provision of liq-
uidity and manipulation of taxes. In our case this policy requires to subsidise physical
capital and tax human capital, while the government must own assets.
Finally, In Chapter 3 we estimate the fiscal multipliers for Greece. In particular,
using the SVAR approach of Blanchard and Perotti we estimate the dynamic effects of
government spending and tax revenues on output. The results over the available sample
indicate some strong Keynesian effects. That is government spending multipliers are
large while the tax multipliers are relatively small. However the conclusions are confined
to the peculiarities of the available sample and are not easily exportable to alternative
periods or allow any generalizations.
vi
Chapter 1
Government debt and Wealth
Inequality
1.1 Introduction
The aftermath of the financial crisis provoked fiscal consolidation plans with unknown
distributive outcomes. Debt adjustments, in particular, become an important priority
for some countries and this comes at a time where concerns over the rise in wealth
inequality are growing. In parallel, the distributional aspects of debt policies have other
prominent macroeconomic implications only recently discovered. For example, Bhandari
et al. (2013) warn that the wealth inequality - or the distribution of public debt in
particular - matters for the growth implications that high levels of public debt might
have1. Besides, wealth inequality may, for example, be a source of inefficient fluctuations
(Ghiglino and Venditti (2011)) or a factor affecting the risk premium (Gollier (2001)).
Accordingly, debt policies might undermine or accelerate these risks through its effect
on the distribution of wealth.
Motivated by such concerns, our main objective is to study the effects of gov-
ernment debt on the inequality of wealth. Thus our paper contributes into a particular
aspect of fiscal policy that, surprisingly, remained relatively unexplored in the litera-
ture. There is a natural relationship linking debt with wealth and this comes from the
savings behaviour of households. Individuals save in this asset and earn interest, but in
the same time public debt becomes a burden that needs to be repaid (i.e. is a deferred
tax)2. Therefore, the manipulation of government debt by fiscal authorities directly
affects the accumulation of assets and by implication the inequality of wealth.
To keep things simple, we develop a “hybrid” version of Diamond (1965) model
with altruistically linked families. However our assumption on altruism is that parents
enjoy utility directly from bequests. The novelty of this approach compromises between
the savings motive of a Ramsey and a Diamond economy. That is the altruism that exists
1The aftermath of the financial crisis triggered a fierce public and academic debate on the effects of
debt on growth. The research of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) further accelerated that particular debate.
For a survey see Panizza and Presbitero (2013)
2In the US for example, currency and bonds holding amount to more than 200% of national income
in the composition of household wealth3.
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in a Ramsey (infinite horizon) model is reconciled with the life-cycle consideration of
a Diamond model. Finally, in order to facilitate comparisons, either for countries of
different legal systems or across distinct tax instruments, we consider separately an
extremely “Regressive”, an extremely “Progressive” and an “Affine” tax system. The
latter combines elements of the former two and is a good approximation of the US tax
system4.
Turning in our results, we consider as our measure of wealth inequality the co-
efficient of variation. Therefore, any change in debt induces a “mean” and a “variance”
effect. At the macroeconomic level an increase in debt will crowd out capital and when
the latter is sufficiently strong, average wealth will fall. For given savings this implies
that inequality tends to increase. But, the increase in debt will also raise the tax burden
and affect the interest rate. Savings responses then will determine the asset position
among individuals and thus the change in variance. This in turn implies that inequality
tends to decrease. In equilibrium, the drop in variance dominates the fall in the mean
and therefore inequality is suppressed. Interestedly, this qualitative effect on inequality
survived across all tax systems.
At the microeconomic level, as soon as debt is conceived as deferred taxation,
different tax instruments coupled with the bequest transfer, constitute a composite
transfers scheme with the usual income and substitution effects (Polemarchakis (1983);
Galor and Polemarchakis (1987)). This insight affects the altruism of individuals and
in consequence their saving behaviour. In this point, we analytically prove that savings
behaviour of the “poor” is ambiguous. The latter property is what might make the
effects of debt on wealth inequality also ambiguous. More specifically, the uncertain
effects on the variability of savings (“variance effect”), might be reasonably attributed
to the behaviour of that fraction of the population.
The significance of this particular result conveys an important message. In our
model the source of the heterogeneity comes through the differences in the initial wealth,
preferences are identical and market frictions are absent. Hence the possibility that indi-
vidual might behave differently it suggests that ex-ante heterogeneity or more generally
the distribution of wealth matters.
The rest of the chapter makes the previous points more rigorous and is organized
as follows; In Section 1.3 the details of the model are set-up. In Section 1.4, the measure
of wealth inequality is constructed and discussed. Section 1.5 focuses on the macroeco-
nomic environment. Section 1.6 analyses the effects on wealth inequality, while Section
1.7 presents the main results.
1.2 Related Literature
Questions on the distributional role of public policies hitherto focused on the implications
across generations, as in Romer (1988) or Altig and Davis (1989) among others, whereas
4See Bhandari et al. (2013).
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this paper examines the effects across the population 5. In general, and to the best of
our knowledge our paper, if not the first, is among the very few that concerned with
the implications of debt policies for the inequality of wealth. Closely related papers
include the one of Floden (2001) and that of Ro¨hrs and Winter (2013). Both papers
are quantitatively orientated and rely on incomplete markets models (in the tradition of
Aiyagari (1994)) to analyse the welfare properties of public debt. Therefore, their scope
differs from ours significantly.
The first paper pins down specific combinations of optimal transfers and debt
levels and examines, among other things, the change in wealth inequality when at a
particular combination. But as in this paper, Floden (2001) also emphasizes the negative
relationship between public debt and wealth inequality. Regarding the latter paper of
Ro¨hrs and Winter (2013), its primary concern is to weight the relative (welfare) merits
of debt adjustments in cases where the distribution of wealth is highly unequal. In
particular, they are evaluating how a reduction of debt affect (in terms of welfare)
different groups of people along the wealth distribution.
In another related study, Heathcote (2005) examines the effects of fiscal policy
(tax shocks) when agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and compares his results
against the first best6. An argument in his paper, highlights the “Ricardian” behaviour
of the poor. As we will show in the main analysis, the model here can equally replicate
this theoretical possibility (See Section 1.6.2 ). Finally, Azzimonti et al. (2012) address
the role of financial liberation in the expansion of both public debt and income inequality.
1.3 The Model
The main environment modifies that of Diamond (1965) into two dimensions. First, we
introduce heterogeneity in labour or “ability” endowments and second allow individuals
to have a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive. Altonji et al. (1997) claim that the partic-
ular bequest motive might be more relevant in practice7. The present procedure also
compromises, in a simple and tractable way, the two extremes between a Ramsey and a
Diamond economy. In the first kind of economy, any life-cycle considerations are nullified
while the latter abstracts from bequests which are clearly relevant in practise. Although
the details of the wealth accumulation and of the main results will be discussed in later
sections, it is instructive at this stage to point out that our findings can still go through
even if one omits altruism. Bequests, however, allows a wealth accumulation process
that is consistent with the literature and therefore we choose to follow this convention.
In this respect, our framework follows the one developed by Bossmann et al. (2007), but
with some variations.
5On the interaction of public debt with bequests, prominent examples are Barro (1974), Laitner
(1979), Drazen (1978) or Burbidge (1983). However those papers do not discuss distributional issues.
6Within the general topic of Fiscal Policy, see also Garcia and Turnovsky (2007) or Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2012) for the effects on income inequality.
7There is a consensus among the profession, over the presence of a bequest motive. For a survey see
Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) or Light and McGarry (2003). For the “joy-of-giving” bequest motive as a
reduced form specification of altruism see Abel and Warshawsky (1987).
3
The demand side of the economy consists of a large number of consumers born
with different endowments. In particular, consumer i of generation t who lives in period
t maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption ctit when young, consumption c
t
it+1
when old and bequests xit+1 to transfer to his “son”. In the notation, the superscript
is the generation index and the subscript denotes calendar time. Total savings atit+1
of the young, determined in period t, are allocated between government bonds and
capital. Bonds to be purchased have to pay the same interest rate as capital, making
the portfolio composition indetermined. Moreover, agents differ in labour endowments
li, which supply inelastically. This is the first source of heterogeneity in this model and it
is assumed to be exogenous. The second one, which is only implicit, is the bequest each
“young” is endowed with8. Consumers then solve the following maximization problem,
where it is assumed that preferences are time separable.
max
ctit,c
t
it+1,xit+1
V it = U(c
t
it)+βU(c
t
it+1) + δU(xit+1) (1.1)
s.t
ctit + a
t
it+1 = D
i
t (1.2)
ctit+1 + (1 + n)xit+1 = (1 + rt+1)a
t
it+1 (1.3)
ctit > 0, c
t
it+1 > 0, xit+1 > 0
The utility function is standard homothetic with the usual neoclassical assump-
tions. Equations (1.2) and (1.3) are the budgets constraint in the two periods of life. In
the notation, Dit is the disposable income of the young and n is the population growth.
The components of disposable income include the after tax wage and the transfer re-
ceived by the “parent”. The degree of altruism, δ is assumed to be lower than the
discount factor β, with 0 < δ < β < 1. Thus, the “parent” values his own consumption
greater. The first order conditions, assuming bequests are operative, are9:
(1 + n)βU ′(ctit+1) = δU
′(xit+1) (1.4)
U ′(ctit) = β(1 + rt+1)U
′(ctit+1) (1.5)
For simplicity, we also assume the distribution of labour endowments to be con-
stant over time with the mean normalized to 1 and some variance σ2. Someone could
justify this assumption based on recent research by Huggett et al. (2011). Their find-
ings suggest that for life-time inequality in wealth and welfare, ex-ante heterogeneity is
far more important than differences in luck (that is, ex-post heterogeneity). Alterna-
tively, the assumption on the distribution of labour endowments, can also be thought
as equivalent to an environment of a fixed intergenerational mobility, which it seems to
8It is also assumed the “initial old” differ in their assets. The maximization problem then will only
involve the consumption and bequests choices.
9The Inada assumptions for preference ensure that bequest will always be operative
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be consistent with the US data (See Chetty et al. (2014)).
The optimum plans, when the distribution of “skills” is constant and prefer-
ences are homothetic, admit solutions in “Gorman Form” (that is,“linear in wealth”).
Accordingly, the optimum plans for savings and bequests are:
atit+1 = SDD
i
t = SD
[
Iit + x
i
t
] ≡ St(Dit, rt+1) (1.6)
xit+1 = XSa
t
it+1 ≡ X(rt+1, atit+1) (1.7)
As usual, rt+1 is the rate of interest in period t + 1, I
i
t is the after tax wage,
while S(Dit, rt+1) and X(rt+1, a
t
it+1) are the optimal savings and bequests functions
respectively. In their “Gorman form” counterparts shown in (1.6) and (1.7), SD denotes
the marginal propensity to save (MPS) out of disposable income, while Xs > 0 is the
marginal propensity to bequeath out of savings (MPB). In Section 1.5, we will use the
inequalities 0 < SD, XS < 1, where XS ≡ (1+n)Xs(1+rt+1) describes the modified or the dynamic
efficiency adjusted MPB10.
On the supply side, markets are competitive and capital depreciates fully within a
period. We also assume that a exists a representative firm, which uses capital and labour
to produce output. The production function is standard neoclassical with common
assumptions. From profits maximization, factor prices in their intensive form equal to:
wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt (1.8)
1 + rt = f
′(kt) > 0 with f(kt)′′ < 0 (1.9)
Moreover it is assumed that exist a government which in period t issues bonds,
Bt+1, and collects taxes Tt. The government uses its revenues to repay interest on the
previously issued bonds, Bt. Thus, debt substitutes taxes to finance some given path
of (unproductive) government expenses. In the text, we will analyse three different
cases in terms of the available tax instrument; A flat (or “Regressive”), a proportional
(or “Progressive”) and an affine tax instrument. The latter, as Bhandari et al. (2013)
argue, it approximates better the tax system in the US. In that case, the analysis on
“Flat” or “Proportional” tax systems will become instrumental to the “Affine tax”
economy for reasons we will discuss later. Nevertheless, flat or more progressive tax
systems alone are also quite common in practice (See Keen et al. (2012) for countries
with “Flat tax” systems). Finally, it is assumed that all taxes fall on “labour” or the
“young” generation. For each case, total tax revenues equal:
Tt =
[
τ ft Nt or τ
p
t wt
Nt∑
i=1
li or τAt wt
Nt∑
i=1
li − TAt Nt
]
where Nt is the population size in period t, τ
F
t the lump-sum tax in “flat tax”
10To ease the notation, omit to make explicit the dependence of MPS and MPB on interest rates and
hence on the time period. For the properties of the savings and bequest functions see On-line Appendix.
5
economy, τpt the marginal tax rate in the “Progressive tax” system and τ
A
t and T
A
t are
the equivalent tax instruments for the “Affine tax” regime. In summary, government’s
budget constraint in absolute terms equals:
Bt+1 + Tt = (1 + rt)Bt
Assuming constant debt per capita policy (and taking into consideration that for
large economies averages converge to their means), the per capita cost for financing this
policy in each case is:
τFt = (rt − n)b (1.10)
τPt =
(rt − n)b
wt
(1.11)
TAt = (rt − n)b− τAt wt (1.12)
where b ≡ Bt+1Nt+1 = BtNt , is debt per capita. In all cases, the model assumes
that debt generates positive savings. In the event of a debt shock and the subsequent
permanent change in disposable income, we keep the terminology in the literature and
refer to it as “wealth effects” (Baxter and King (1993)).
For the affine tax economies there are two degrees of freedom: The government
to maintain its policy can either adjust its flat tax component or the marginal tax rate.
The specification in (1.12) implies the first to occur. If instead, the option was on the
marginal tax rate, results would follow that of the proportional tax system11.
Another peculiarity that emerges in an “Affine” tax system is that individuals,
for given endowments, are segregated between those who pay taxes and those who
receive subsides. To see this, note that the after tax wages in this case are wtl
i − [(rt −
n)b + τAt wt(l
i − 1)]. Therefore, if the economy is dynamic inefficient, only those with
endowment li < 1 are subsidised; Whether the rest will be paying taxes or not, depend
on the degree of dynamic inefficiency and the marginal tax rate. On the other hand,
if the economy is dynamic efficient, as we can see from equation (1.12), the TA term
can be either positive or negative. This depends, in turn, on whether debt repayments
are “high” or not relative to the revenues collected from wages. As previously, some
“poor” (li < 1 − (rt−n)b
τAwt
) are subject to negative taxation (that is “implicit welfare
benefits”). Nevertheless, none of those “discriminating” features will play any role for
the qualitative pattern of the results.
1.4 Wealth Accumulation and Wealth Inequality
Bequests facilitate the intergenerational link for the transmission of wealth among fam-
ilies. Substituting (1.7) in (1.6), wealth accumulation takes the following form:
11See footnote 25 in Section 1.6 and the discussion therein.
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atit+1 = SD[I
i
t +Xsa
t−1
it ]⇒ atit+1 = SDIit + SDXs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C4t
at−1it (1.13)
Hence, the individual wealth (1.13) shows that is a first order, and non-homogeneous,
difference equation in asset holdings, ait. Its exact form, will depend on the three dif-
ferent tax structures, the after tax wage equals
Iit =
[
wtli − τFt , (1− τPt )wtli, (1− τAt )wtli − TAt
]
.
Equation (1.13) describes the transmission process of wealth accumulation. Its
intuition is very simple: The wealth of a family (or “Dynasty”) is the sum of the own
wealth plus any financial wealth left by the predecessor in form of transfers. In the
previous period, part (1 − SD) of transfers were consumed and the rest (SD) were
saved. From that financial stock, a certain amount was kept for consumption and the
rest, XS , passed on to the offspring. Thus, SDXS reflects the fraction from total savings
attributed to altruism. This component, along with own wealth, determines the available
asset position in the current period.
It follows that in the absence of any willingness to bequeath, initial wealth levels
persist forever, whereas some degree of altruism allows individual wealth to expand12,
but only under the assumption that debt cannot affect the coefficient of correlation
between generations. Therefore, unless this degree is not too high (reflected in XS),
wealth accumulation might become explosive. In (1.13), a sufficient condition for mean-
reversion is C4t ≡ SDXs < 1. However, as soon as XS depends on the interest rate, debt
policies become critical for the existence of a stationary state in the microeconomic level.
Nonetheless, as we will show in Section 1.5, a more stringent condition is needed for the
macroeconomic or financial stability13. In this respect, our paper is also related to
Rankin and Roffia (2003) and it is interesting to extent the discussion, on the maximum
level of debt that is possible to finance a given level of inequality. At present is it useful
to clarify that although in our paper we do not explore sustainability issues, the implicit
assumption is that the level of debt is such that a macroeconomic steady state always
exists.
For later, is it useful to define the ratio SD1−SDXS . The numerator (SD) is the
fraction of savings attributed to the gross life-cycle considerations; that is, to finance
future expenditures. The denominator (1 − SDXS) is the fraction of own investments
allocated to personal consumption. Then, the ratio of these two can define the net life-
cycle component of savings; that is, the part of total wealth invested to finance future
consumption net of bequests. We call this ratio as the egoistic MPS 14. In the subsequent
analysis, this fraction will interact with the wage rate, giving a very natural meaning
in the event of a shock. In fact, any perturbation on the SDw1−SDXS term will reflect a
12Of course the ranking of individuals within the distribution remains the same. Nothing would have
changed if we have allowed for a social mobility as in Bossmann et al. (2007)
13While SD might not depend on interest rates (e.g with log utility), the MPB always does.
14The term is inspired by Laitner and Ohlsson (2001).
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“battle” between the own life-cycle and the altruistic considerations.
1.4.1 Stationary/Steady State wealth inequality
A tractable measure of inequality frequently used in the literature and the one also
employed in Bossmann et al. (2007) is the coefficient of variation, CV =
√
V ar(ait)
E(ait)
. In
this definition, E(ait) is the mean wealth and V ar(ait) the variance. To construct the
steady state measure of coefficient of variation, we use the law of motion in equation
(1.13), and impose the steady state conditions - assuming C4 < 1 - E(ait+1) = E(ait) =
E(ai), Var(ait+1) = Var(ait) = Var(ai), and we substitute for taxes from the government
budget constraint. Simple algebra then shows that average or mean wealth in the steady
state is:
E(ai) =
SD[w − (r − n)b]
1− SDXs (1.14)
Whereas, the steady state variance of wealth for each case of taxes is:
VarP(ai) =
[
SD[w − (r − n)b]
]2
σ2
1− (SDXs)2 (1.15)
VarF(ai) =
(SDw)
2 σ2
1− (SDXs)2 (1.16)
VarA(ai) = (1− τA)2VarF(a) (1.17)
where in the cases above, we made use of equations (1.10), (1.11) and (1.12)
respectively. Note that in the “Progressive” tax system and in contrast to the other
ones, debt policies affect the dispersion of wealth directly (equation (1.15)). Second,
an “Affine” tax instrument only rescales the variance of a flat tax economy (equation
(1.17)). Therefore, the choice for the marginal tax rate only parametrizes the level of
inequality and it is irrelevant for the qualitative effects15. Third, since the mean for all
these economies is the same by construction, to compare the levels of wealth inequality
between them is just sufficient to compare the variances. It turns out that if the economy
is dynamic inefficient (r < n), the “Progressive” tax system will produce more wealth
inequality. This seems intuitive, since the rich are more heavily subsidised. Note also
that the wealth dispersion in affine tax economy will be higher relative to “Progressive”
one, iff the marginal tax rate is not “too low” relative to the interest rate16.
Finally, from (1.14), (1.17), (1.16) and (1.15) the stationary coefficient of varia-
tion for each case equals:
15If instead, the free parameter was set to be the TA, the respective measure would had followed that
of the “Progressive” tax system.
16 Comparing the variances someone has to sign the term SD(τ
Aw)− (r−n)b, if positive this implies
that the “progressive” tax system has higher inequalities than the “Affine” one, otherwise is the opposite.
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CVP = σ
(√
SD[w − (r − n)b]
(1 + SDXs)
)
(1.18)
CVF = σ
(
SDw√
(1 + SDXs)
√
SD[w − (r − n)b]
)
(1.19)
CVA = σ(1− τ)CVF (1.20)
Overall, inequality as captured by the coefficient of variation, is a function of
wages, interest rates and taxes. The latter, however, and through the government’s
budget constraint it also depends on factor prices. In other words, we could assume
that wealth inequality ultimately depends on wages and interest rates, i.e CV = F(w, r)
where F(.) is some particular function describing the relationship - which in our case
takes one of the three forms in equations (1.18)-(1.20). Of course, since factor prices
are functions of the physical capital, we can also note that the level of inequality is
ultimately an implicit function of capital only - the level of which will depend on the
level of public debt, treated in our model as an exogenous parameter. Accordingly,
“macroeconomic shocks” - like a permanent change in public debt - are of first-order
importance in “shifting” the distribution of wealth (i.e. a change in inequality levels),
through the change in factor prices.
As we will later prove, the source for the change in factor prices, and therefore
the trigger for a “macroeconomic shock”, in our exercise will be the change in the level
of government debt. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation captures in a very simple
term all the general equilibrium effects that can possibly affect relative wealth. As we
will see on the one hand there is a permanent shift in the supply of assets - and thus
average wealth is changing - but on the other hand, since the incomes of the households
will also change, the is a respective effect on the variability of assets.
1.5 The Macroeconomic environment
The condition that characterizes the equilibrium of the model, comes through the finan-
cial markets clearing condition. The particular condition, requires capital and bonds to
compete for the average savings of the “young”. For the large economies, average sav-
ings equal the mean assets, which in turn equal the savings of the “representative-mean”
individual. Therefore, the financial markets clearing condition in per capita terms is:
E(ait+1) ≡ (1 + n)(kt+1 + b) = St(Dt, rt+1) (1.21)
where S(Dt, rt+1) is the optimal mean saving function (See (1.6)), Dt = wt−(r−
n)b+X(rt, St) denotes the mean disposable income and X(rt, St)) is the mean bequest
function (See (1.7)), all in period t. For the macroeconomic state, only the mean taxes
matter (i.e. the taxes the individual with the mean “skill” faces). As a consequence,
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for all of our three economies, the aggregate behaviour is governed by the same law of
motion (1.21), of a first-order non-linear difference equation with respect to physical
capital17.
Example 1 Assuming that the preferences are logarithmic and taking the case of the
flat tax regime, the optimal plans for individual savings and bequests are:
ait+1 =
(
β + δ
1 + β + δ
)
[wtl
i − τ ft + xit] (1.22)
xit+1 =
(
δ
(1 + n)(β + δ)
)
(1 + rt+1)ait+1 (1.23)
Substituting (1.23) in (1.22), using the budget constraint of the government, imposing
the market clearing condition (1.21) and taking the average across individuals, the law
of motion for physical capital is:
(1+n)(kt+1+b) =
(
β + δ
1 + β + δ
)[
wt(kt)−(rt(kt)−n)b+
(
δ
(1 + n)(β + δ)
)
(1+rt)(kt+b)
]
(1.24)
Which clearly shows that the dynamics of the system are governed by a first-order dif-
ference equation.
Obviously, (1.21) is the generic form that combines the sum of optimal savings
and bequests plans of individual, i.e. equation (1.13), in per capita terms. For this
specific law of motion, the stability condition is:
0 <
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
db=0
=
SD
[
− (k + b)f ′′ +Xrf ′′ + (1 + n)Xs
]
[(1 + n)− Srf ′′] < 1 (1.25)
To gain some further insights from (1.25), this can alternatively be written as:
C4 ≡ SDXs < 1−

[
Sr + SD[(
1
Z+1 − 1)(k + b)
]
1 + n
 f ′′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π
(1.26)
where Xr ≡ ∂X(rt,St−1)∂rt+1 =
S(D,r)
1+n
Z+1 =
(k+b)
Z+1 , and Z =
δU ′′(xt+1)
(1+n)2βU ′′(ct+1) > 0 ⇒ 1Z+1 <
1. In the “normal” case where ∂S(D,r)∂r ≡ Sr < 0, the sign of Π is positive for any
(non-negative) debt level18. In consequence, for macroeconomic or financial stability a
stronger restriction on C4 = SDXS is necessary. For example, in the special case of
17Recall, wt = w(kt), rt = r(kt) and as a consequence Xt = X(kt), Dt = D(kt).
18 Sr < 0 implies that any increase in the supply of assets will decrease interest rates for some given
asset demand. In conventional models with CEIS (CRRA) utility function Sr is negative when the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is less than one. Nonetheless, the case of Sr < 0 does not rule
out “sunspot” behaviour (i.e. multiple steady states). See Galor and Ryder (1989). Therefore, in the
numerical exercises, we will assume local analysis.
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a logarithmic utility function Sr = 0. In that particular case, the stability condition
implies a more definite upper bound C(b) (controlled by debt policy) such as the average
intergenerational wealth persistence which should not only be less than one but also less
than a specific threshold, i.e. C4 < C(b) < 1.
The main message of the paragraph above, deems financial stability to be jointly
determined by the amount of debt and the level of inequality. More specifically, in the
most plausible case (Sr < 0), the microeconomic condition for stationary distribution is
necessary but not sufficient for macroeconomic stability. Loosely put, “average private
altruism” is detached from the “average social altruism” and debt policies can affect
the distance between them, not necessarily directly but indirectly through its effect on
marginal propensity to bequeath19. In what follows, we will assume that the steady
state is stable and Sr ≤ 0.
In what follows, we limit our analysis in the steady state. The equilibrium in
financial markets then is:
E(a) =
SD[w − (r − n)b]
1− SDXs ≡ (1 + n)(k + b) = S(D, r) (1.27)
Note from equation (1.27) that what matters for the supply of funds is the fraction
of mean savings assigned to finance future consumption net of bequests (i.e. the egoistic
MPS). When this feature is taken into consideration, then the model resembles that of
Diamond (1965). By total differentiation of (1 + n)(k + b) = S(D, r), the change in
capital due to a unit change in government debt is:
dk
db
=
SD
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[XS − 1] f ′ +
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(SD − 1)(1 + n)
(1 + n− Srf ′′)(1− dkt+1
dkt
∣∣
db=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q>0
)
< 0 (1.28)
where Q = (1 + n − Srf ′′)(1 − dkt+1dkt
∣∣
db=0
) > 0 is positive from the stability
condition and the numerator negative, since 0 < SD, XS < 1. Therefore, higher public
debt always crowds out capital and increases the interest rates. Under the assumption of
Sr < 0, the “income effect” dominates the “substitution effect” and in equilibrium, the
rise in interest rate will depress average (mean) savings. The same occurs if Sr = 0 (i.e.
when the utility is logarithmic)20. The result of the fall in average wealth, indicates that
debt will crowd out capital by more than one. The implication of this statement is that
average wealth falls. Thus, the direct macroeconomic effects of a positive debt shock
tends to increase wealth inequality. However, the equilibrium effects on inequality also
depend on the change in the variance. The next section takes this issue more closely.
19In completely different setting and concerns, Farhi and Werning (2007) show the existence of long-
run (consumption and welfare) distributions when the social discounting (altruism) is different from the
private.
20See Bertola et al. (2006, Chapter 5)
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1.6 The Effects on Inequality
1.6.1 The “Mechanics” at the Macroeconomic level
To motivate the discussion on the mechanics of the model, the total change in inequality
in the stationary state is decomposed as:
dCV (V ar(a), E(a)) = W1dV ar(a) +W2(dE(a))⇒ (1.29)
= W1dV ar(a) +W2(1 + n)(dk + db)⇒ (1.30)
dCV
db
= W1︸︷︷︸
+
dV ar(a)
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variance effect
+W2(1 + n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(
dk
db
+ 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean Effect
(1.31)
The formulation above reveals the “mean” and “variance” effects akin to the
one described by Bossmann et al. (2007), where W1 =
∂CV
∂V ar and W2 =
∂CV
∂E(a) are the
relevant contributions of each separate change in the mean and the variance. The mean
is affected by the extent of crowding out, while the variance -as we will discuss later- by
the equilibrium changes in savings behaviour.
In equation (1.31), the “mean effect” is positive since debt crowds out capital by
more than one (i.e. dkdb + 1 < 0 ). In this instance, average wealth falls and therefore
inequality tends to increase for unchanged variance. Nevertheless, individual savings
responses due to the perturbation in factor prices will also affect the variance. For
example, when the variance drops, inequality tends to decrease for a given mean. Overall
however, the equilibrium effect on wealth inequality will be ambiguous.
In this context, the debt shock will trigger factor price changes through the
standard “OLG-Diamond model” mechanism. In short, when the average savings net of
government bonds falls, the equilibrium interest rates will increase. In return, the change
in factor prices will determine savings behaviour and thus the effect on the variance.
The perturbation on the variance is crucially dependent on factor price changes. In fact,
it is the silent features of those general equilibrium effects that could possibly reverse
the effects on wealth inequality. If those are not in operation, any conclusions will be
overturned.
To gain some further insights for the mechanics at the macro level, we totally
differentiate ˆCV P ≡ (CV P )2
σ2
in the case of the “Progressive Tax” economy, and ˆCV F ≡
(CV F )2
σ2
for the “Flat” tax economy21. For the latter economy, equation (1.19) can be
restated in a functional form as ˆCV F = ΦF (C3, C4, C5), where C3 = SDw, C4 = SDXS ,
C5 = SD(r − n)b and ΦF = C
2
3
(1+C4)(C3−C5) . By total differentiation, someone gets:
21For the “Affine” tax economy, the equivalent expression is (CV
A)2
((1−τA)σ)2 . Since the qualitative effects
are the same up to some constants, we will reserve the discussion for the “Flat tax” case only.
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dCˆV
F
= ΦF3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Φ
F
4︸︷︷︸
−
dC4 + Φ
F
5︸︷︷︸
+
dC5 (1.32)
or equivalently,
dCˆV
F
db
=
[
ΦF3︸︷︷︸
+
[w∆− SDk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ ΦF4︸︷︷︸
−
Γ︸︷︷︸
?
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average change
in Life-Cycle considerations
dr
db
+ ΦF5︸︷︷︸
+
[
E︸︷︷︸
+
b
dr
db
+ SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average effect
of Taxation
(1.33)
where the phi′s are ΦFj ≡ ∂
ˆCV F
∂Cj
for j=[3,4,5], and Γ, ∆ and E are terms defined
in Appendix 1.9.4. In Table 1.1 below we can see the necessary and sufficient conditions
to sign those. In the case of a logarithmic utility, the Γ and E terms are always positive
and ∆ = 0 (See Appendix 1.9.4 for the proofs). For any other utility function, we will
assume that Γ < 0 and E > 0. In other words, we implicitly assume that the level of
debt is not “too high” and consumers have plausible marginal propensities to save 22.
Conditions on MPC
(+) SD > 0.5
Γ
(-) SD < 0.5
(+) DI or SD ≥ 0.5 or S∗D < SD < 0.5
E
(-) SD < S
∗
D < 0.5
DI=Dynamic Inefficiency. The special cases are: SD =
1
2
⇒ Γ = 0,
b = w
2(r−n) ⇒ Φ
F
3 = 0 and SD = S
∗ < 0.5 ⇒ E = 0. S∗D is a
particular threshold which equals to S∗ = 1
2
− 1
2
1+n
f′ and is assumed
to be positive. In the case of logarithmic utility Γ, E > 0 always
Table 1.1: Main Conditions
From equation (1.32), the total change in wealth inequality is attributed to three
main factors. First, it depends on how much individuals will save (or dissave) out of
their new wage (the dC3 term). As soon as the level of debt is not too high, to avoid
any “immiseration” from very low wages, the “rich” can save more than the “poor” and
therefore inequality tends to increase (the ΦF3 > 0 term). Second, a change in debt
will affect the fraction of “parent’s” savings that are “bequeathed” on top of “children’s
wealth (the dC4 term). On average, leaving positive bequests tends to have an equalizing
effect (the ΦF4 term). Finally, a permanent increase in government borrowing will result
to higher taxation (the dC3 term), but as soon as taxes are of “regressive” nature they
will tend to amplify the inequality levels (the ΦF5 term).
In general, the effects on inequality are ambiguous. In particular, the source of
ambiguity stems from the competing effects of the life-cycle and bequest motives (the
ΦF3 [w∆− SDk] + ΦF4 Γ terms). Since these motives cannot be isolated at the individual
22See for example Jappelli and Pistaferri (2012) and the literature therein.
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level, as a result they also appear at the macro level. In the subsequent sections,
where the individual behaviour is analysed, the “rich” and the “poor” will have opposite
qualitative responses on these two saving scopes.
Similarly, equation (1.18) can be restated as ˆCV P = ΦP (C3, C4, C5) and by total
differentiation the total change is:
dCˆV
F
= ΦP3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Φ
P
4︸︷︷︸
−
dC4 + Φ
P
5︸︷︷︸
−
dC5 (1.34)
or equivalently,
dCˆV
P
db
=
[
ΦP3︸︷︷︸
+
[w∆− SDk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ ΦP4︸︷︷︸
−
Γ︸︷︷︸
?
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average change
in Life-Cycle considerations
dr
db
+ ΦP5︸︷︷︸
−
[
E︸︷︷︸
+
b
dr
db
+ SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average effect
of Taxation
(1.35)
where the phi′s are ΦPj ≡ ∂
ˆCV P
∂Cj
for j=[3,4,5]. The analysis is similar to the one
before. The only caveat is that while wages before-tax have an unequalising effect (the
ΦP3 term), the “progressivism” of the tax system tends to offset it (the Φ
P
5 term).
Example: Consider the case of the proportional tax system. If preferences
are logarithmic (Γ > 0, ∆ = 0), it follows from equation (1.35) that higher public
debt will decrease inequality. In the case of a flat tax system, this is only true if the
economy is dynamic inefficient (r < n). If not, it requires the average change in life-cycle
consideration to dominate the “wealth effects” from taxation.
Notice also that under a “partial equilibrium analysis” (captured in Φj5SD(r −
n) terms for j=[P,F]), the effects on inequality will follow what the tax instrument is
supposed to do by design. However, the general equilibrium “feedback”, due to price
changes, might overturn this and in fact the effect on wealth inequality can go in either
direction. Therefore, it is more proper, not only to understand what will be observed
at macro-level, but also what a debt shock will trigger at micro-level.
1.6.2 The “Mechanics” at the Individual level
The change in the variance, while it seems of quantitative nature, we can still filter out
some interesting qualitative properties. In general, to calculate the variance of wealth,
it is sufficient to know the asset position of each individual. In this simple model,
in order to understand the change in the variance, we should know the equilibrium
savings responses. In this context, where altruism is taken into account, individuals
will program their savings responses on the basis of their “egoistic needs” and their
“altruistic liabilities”. These two scopes can further decompose the change in variance
(and thus in total wealth) into the “egoistic” and “altruistic” part respectively.
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To begin the exposition, we will first consider a “Flat” tax system. In the sta-
tionary state xit+1 = x
i
t = x
i (and at the macro-level kt+1 = kt = k) substituting (1.7)
in (1.6) and using (1.10) in Di = wtl
i − τF + xi, individual savings are equal to:
aFi =
SD
1− SDXSwl
i − SD
1− SDXS (r − n)b⇒ (1.36)
aFi = E(a
i) +
SD
1− SDXSw(l
i − 1)⇒ (1.37)
Equation (1.37) confirms that better endowed individuals are wealthier. Taxes in
this case are only implicit to the individual decision making and what in effect matters
is the fraction of wages someone can save for his own consumption; the SD1−SDXSw(l
i−1)
term23. In fact, this term will determine the change in the variance. To see this,
restate the egoistic MPS times the wage in functional form as Ψ(C3, C4) =
C3
1−C4 , where
C3 = SDw and C4 = SDXS as defined before. From equation (1.37), the total change
in individual wealth becomes:
dai = dE(ai) +
 Ψ3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
dC4
 (li − 1)⇒ (1.38)
or equivalently,
dai
db
= (1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ dE(ai)
db
+
 Ψ3︸︷︷︸+ (w∆− SDk︸ ︷︷ ︸− )(l
i − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
+ Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
Γ︸︷︷︸
−
(li − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2

dr
db︸︷︷︸
+
(1.39)
where C3, C4, ∆ < 0 and Γ are terms discussed before and Ψi =
∂Ψ(C3,C4)
∂Ci
for
i = [3, 4]. In the most plausible case where the MPS is SD < 0.5, it implies Γ < 0
(See also Table 1.1). From equation (1.38), the perturbation in individual wealth is
decomposed into two parts; an aggregate (which essentially comes from the change
in factor prices) and an idiosyncratic one (which essentially comes from the different
endowments). On the one hand, a debt shock will affect everyone equally (the d(E(a))db
term). On the other hand, individuals will adjust their savings (an intertemporal choice)
and in parallel decide how much to bequeath from their investments (an inratemporal
choice). In other words, consumers will save a different fraction of their new wage (the
dC3 term), and at the same time will alter the fraction gone to bequests (the dC4 term).
By looking at equation (1.39), the “rich” consumers will save and bequeath less (the
23Note, the model can also be interpreted as one where individuals differ in their MPS, i.e. the SDl
i
term, but the distribution of li is such that the average MPS is SD. For example, this is rationalized if
agents differ in their discount factors and therefore the more impatient individuals end up having more
wealth. In fact, the spirit of the model might be closer to this interpretation, however the convention in
the literature considers the interpretation given in the main text as more appropriate.
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N1 < 0 and N2 < 0 terms respectively) and the “poor” more. Thus, when a debt shock
occurs, the “idiosyncratic” and “aggregate” components operate in the same direction
for the “rich” but not for the “poor”. In consequence, the wealth of the “rich” would
fall but remain qualitatively uncertain for the other group.
Put simply, a rise in interest rates will induce the usual income and substitution
effects. Nevertheless, those should be considered in terms of future expenditures (that
is, future consumption and the bequest transfer). At the same time, the change in
interest rate will affect the intratemporal choice. On the one hand, more bequests can be
transferred due to the increase in XS , whereas on the other hand, less can be bequeathed
due to the effect in SD. For people with different endowments, the intratemporal choice
is not the same. But by looking in equation above it seems, the savings behaviour of
the “rich” is aligned with the macroeconomic effect and their wealth falls. In this case,
the extended to altruism “income effect” dominates the “substitution effect” and will
reinforce the “wealth effect”. For the “poor”, the idiosyncratic component competes
with the aggregate one, hence their equilibrium response is ambiguous24.
However, if the utility is logarithmic (∆ = 0 and Γ > 0), this implies that the
change in savings will be ambiguous for either groups. In this case, the “rich” will now
want to bequeath more and save less, whereas the “poor” will want to do the opposite.
Nonetheless, as we show in Section 1.7, the relatively “rich” will still dis-save, which
implies that the “egoistic” component (the N1 term) will dominate the altruistic one
( the N2 term). Possibly, this is because future consumption is valued more. In this
case though, the fraction of own investments that go to bequests will (unambiguously)
increase on average (dC4 ↑). This average increase, in turn, boils down to the special case
analysed by Bossmann et al. (2007), where higher bequests induce the aforementioned
“mean” and “variance” effects on the macroeconomic level.
For the “Affine tax”, the analysis is analogous. To see this, note that the sta-
tionary individual wealth can be written as:
aAi = a
F
i − τA
[
SD
1− SDXSw(l
i − 1)
]
(1.40)
daAi
db
=
daFi
db
− τA
[
SD
1−SDXSw(l
i − 1)
]
db
(1.41)
Therefore, up to some constant determined by the marginal tax rate, the quali-
tative pattern remains identical25.
For the “progressive” tax regime using equation (1.11), the disposable income is
Di = (1− τp)wli + xi. As in the earlier procedure, the individual wealth equals:
24This property was also found in Da´vila et al. (2012)
25If instead the free parameter for the “Affine tax” economy was TA, stationery individual wealth
would alter to aAi = a
P
i −
(
Sd
1−SDXS
)
TA. The total change in savings would be
daAi
db
=
aPi
db
−
TA
1−SDXS
[
∆ + ( SD
1−SDXS )Γ
]
dr
db
. As soon as 0 < TA < 1, the qualitative pattern is similar to the one
shown in Section 1.7 for the proportional tax.
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aPi =
(
SD(w − (r − n)b)
1− SDXS
)
li = E(a)li ⇒ (1.42)
aPi − E(a) = E(a)(li − 1) (1.43)
And the effect of debt on individual wealth is:
dai
db
=
dE(a)
db
li =
[
(1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1)
]
li (1.44)
From equation (1.42), each individual holds a fraction of total wealth which is in
proportion of his endowment. In consequence, the effect of debt on individual savings
will also be in the same proportion (See equation (1.44)). From the previous analysis, we
know that higher public debt will decrease average wealth. Therefore, equation (1.44)
also implies a negative impact on individual wealth. In particular, the effect will be
stronger for the relatively “rich” and milder for the relatively “poor”. However, the
change in variance is still ambiguous, but of quantitative nature, since all agents are
dis-saving. Nonetheless, some hidden qualitative differences still exist.
As earlier, any change in the dispersion of asset holdings can be decomposed
into the part coming from own savings and the part stemming from the altruism of
parents. This decomposition is interesting on its own. For the “Flat” or “Affine” tax
economy, the behavioural elements of those were clear. But even in this case, a similar
decomposition is still possible. By adding and subtracting the relevant terms, the asset
holdings in the “proportional” economy can be written in terms of the flat tax economy
as:
aPi = a
F
i −
C5
1− C4 (l
i − 1) (1.45)
where C5 = SD(r − n)b and C4 = SDXS . As expected, equation (1.45) confirms
that the “rich” own less assets whereas the “poor” more, relative to a regressive tax
system. Defining ΨP = C51−C4 , using equation (1.39) and collecting terms, the effect of
debt on asset holdings becomes:
daPi
db
=
dE(ai)
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
[
Ψ3︸︷︷︸
+
(w∆− SDk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP1
+ Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
Γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP2
]
dr
db︸︷︷︸
+
(li − 1)− ΨP5︸︷︷︸
+
[
Eb
dr
db
+ SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP3 >0
(li − 1) (1.46)
where Ψ4 = Ψ4 − ΨP4 = E(ai), and ΨPi = ∂Ψ
P
∂Ci
for i=[4,5]. The NP3 term is
positive because of the change in taxes26. Equation (1.46) is a simple reformulation
26We assume that this is also true even in the dynamic inefficient case. Under a particular bound on
debt, this is always the case.
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of (1.44), so all individual will have to dis-save in the end. Nonetheless, the different
behavioural motives, as in the “Flat” tax economy, are still present ( the second term
in (1.46), with the NP3,4 replacing the N1,2 terms). However, the “progressivism” of the
tax system modifies the personal “wealth effects” ( the third term in (1.46)) and thus
the incentive to save or dis-save. For instance, the “rich” expecting to bear higher taxes
have an incentive to save more, while the “poor” less.
In summary, when individuals have the particular bequest motive ex-ante het-
erogeneity itself becomes sufficient to generate different qualitative behaviour to a debt
shock. The tax instrument then, will only determine the nature of the change in in-
equality (i.e. whether this will be of quantitative or qualitative nature).
1.7 Steady State Results
We restrict our analysis in the stationary state, where we also impose the condition
Sr ≤ 0. Debt is treated as an exogenous parameter, therefore it will determine the
values of capital and the interest rates. We pick a number such as in our numerical
exercises the stability and the condition for mean reversion wealth (See equation (1.25))
are satisfied. Moreover, to assess the effect of debt on capital we rely on equation (1.28),
to assess the effects on wealth inequality we use equations (1.33) and (1.35), and finally
to assess the individual savings behaviour, we rely on equations (1.44), (1.39) and (1.41)
respectively. To figure out the effects on the mean and the variance, we evaluate the
(1 + n)(dkdb + 1),
dV arP
db ,
dV arF
db and
dV arA
db derivatives.
We also assume a CEIS (“CRRA”) utility function of the form: V =
c1−θt −1
1−θ +
β
(
c1−θt+1−1
1−θ
)
+δ
(
x1−θt+1−1
1−θ
)
, where the choices for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution θ are 1.5 and θ = 1 (i.e. logarithmic utility). The production function
in its intensive form is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, y = Akγ , with A = 9.37, γ = 0.3.
Population growth, n, is set to 1.81 to match the average post war growth rate in the
US. The choices for the discount factor, β and the degree of altruism δ, are set to 0.3 and
0.10 respectively, when the value for debt is 0.05. This is the case of a dynamic efficient
economy where it ensures that all conditions of the model are satisfied. Similarly, we
set β = 0.4 and δ = 0.15 with b = 0.11 for the dynamic inefficient case.
The values for the discount factor are motivated by the RBC literature. There,
β = 0.99 and each period represents a quarter. In our calibration, this is similar to
consider the time period as 30 years in the first case and around 25 years in the second
one. The choice for the degree of altruism is essentially arbitrary but closely follows
that of Bossmann et al. (2007). In all cases, the MPS is restricted to be less than half.
Finally, the choice for the marginal tax rate in the “Affine” tax economy is taken from
Bhandari et al. (2013) and set to τA = 0.2.
In Table 1.2 we can see the results obtained for our economy. At the macroeco-
nomic level and in all cases, the mean and variance fall. This tends to move the inequality
to opposite direction. Nevertheless, the “variance effect” dominates the “mean effect”
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and inequality is suppressed. But, the individual mechanics (between the tax systems)
are different.
Dynamic Efficiency Dynamic Inefficiency
Endowment Flat Affine Prop. Flat Affine Prop.
0.2 3.20 2.14 -0.42 2.97 2.01 -0.37
0.3 2.54 1.61 -0.63 2.37 1.53 -0.55
0.4 1.88 1.08 -0.84 1.77 1.05 -0.73
0.7 -0.11 -0.51 -1.47 -0.03 -0.39 -1.28
1 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10 -1.83 -1.83 -1.83
2 -8.73 -7.40 -4.20 -7.84 -6.64 -3.67
5 -28.62 -23.32 -10.50 -25.87 -21.06 -9.17
10 -61.77 -49.84 -21.00 -55.92 -45.10 -18.35
Mean effect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Change in Variance (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Inequality (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Mean effect = W2(1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1), with W2 < 0, Variance effect = W1
dV ar(ai)
db
, with W1 > 0.
Each column describes the savings response for the different taxes to a 1% increase in debt.
Table 1.2: Main Results
In the “progressive” tax regime, everyone’s wealth falls proportionally, as dis-
cussed in Section 1.6.2. However, in the rest of the cases, there is a clear qualitative
difference between different groups of people. In fact, the “poorer” someone is the more
is willing to save. Thus, the “poor” in this context seem to behave as “Ricardians”27.
The intuition for the behaviour of the poor is the following: The “poorest” individuals
(who had already low wages prior to the shock) would see their real wage to decline
further and their tax liability (regressive in nature) to increase. Unless they start saving
more, by exploiting the rise in the rate of interest, they will not be in a position to
finance their future consumption net of bequests.
In other words, the substitution effect is sufficiently strong to dominate both the
income and the wealth effects. This is not the case for the “rich”, where the income
effect always dominates. In “Affine” tax system, as soon as the choice for the tax
adjustment is on the common tax component, individual behaviour will follow that of
a flat tax economy. However, since not everyone will pay the exact equal amounts in
taxes, the quantitative response will be different. The same analysis goes through for
the dynamic inefficient economies. Nevertheless, in this case and in contrast to the
previous one, the “equity-efficiency” trade-off breaks down, which extends Diamond’s
original contribution.
In Table 1.3, we see the results obtained for the logarithmic utility. As someone
can observe, the qualitative pattern is similar to the one described above and follows
the discussion in Section 1.6.2
27See Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) for a clear exposition on the failure (at least on average) of the Ri-
cardian equivalence under a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive. Moreover, the positive association between
debt and the savings behaviour of the “poor” was also present in Heathcote (2005) .
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Dynamic Efficiency Dynamic Inefficiency
Endowment Flat Affine Prop. Flat Affine Prop.
0.2 3.62 2.57 -0.33 2.40 1.77 -0.15
0.3 2.96 2.04 -0.49 2.00 1.45 -0.23
0.4 2.30 1.51 -0.65 1.61 1.14 -0.30
0.7 0.33 -0.06 -1.15 0.43 0.19 -0.53
0.8 -0.32 -0.59 -1.31 0.03 -0.13 -0.61
0.9 -0.98 -1.11 -1.47 -0.36 -0.44 -0.68
1 -1.64 -1.64 -1.64 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76
2 -8.20 -6.89 -3.27 -4.71 -3.92 -1.52
5 -27.90 -22.64 -8.18 -16.55 -13.39 -3.79
10 -60.72 -48.90 -16.36 -36.28 -29.18 -7.59
Mean effect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Change in Variance (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Inequality (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Mean effect = W2(1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1), with W2 < 0, Variance effect = W1
dV ar(ai)
db
, with W1 > 0.
Each column describes the saving response for the different taxes.
Table 1.3: Logarithmic Utility
To put it simple, the bottom line of the previous analyses is that public debt
affects the accumulation of wealth, and by extension wealth inequality, through a dual
channel. On the one hand, a permanent change in the supply of debt affects the average
wealth of the economy, meaning that not only it affects the opportunity of someone to
accrue interest, but also the level of assets available for each family.
This simple, yet plausible observation, it is mightily related to the standard
neoclassical result of “crowing-out”, which our paper also replicates. That is, when a
unit increase of public debt, for example, causes a disproportional reduction in physical
capital leading to a fall in average wealth, “poor” households are in disadvantage. This
is because, the families that are “poor” are also the ones that save or invest less in assets.
The crowing out of capital, therefore, tend to increase wealth inequality. It follows then
that to the hypothetical case where bonds increase and are equally distributed across the
population, this policy does not necessary improve the position of the poor compared
to the rich, for the simple reason that the supply of other assets will disproportionally
fall leaving, therefore, the “poor” with fewer assets than before.
On the other hand, the change in public debt it also affects incomes and this
occurs in two ways. The one is due to the change in taxation, the other is due to the
effect on prices. As soon as, however, taxes mostly fall on labour incomes - i.e the
young - this is equivalent to a transfer scheme from young-to-old, as for example, would
have occurred with unfunded social security. It follows then that older households got
richer, and as a result would be able to leave more transfers to their kids. This helps the
accumulation of wealth, and especially for the “poor” households this can even off-set
the drop in wages and the increase in labour taxes. Bequest, therefore, and as Bossmann
et al. (2007) have stated help households to accumulate more wealth on the one hand,
but also to decrease the dispersion of wealth on the other. As we numerically showed,
however, quantitatively the latter dominates; twisting therefore the implications that
the crowd-out of capital could bring. As a result, we view bequests as important to the
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our findings.
To see this more clearly, consider that for any given level of assets the substitution
effect - due to the change in the interest rate- for the rich is weaker relative to the “poor”,
which implies that when interest rates rise, “poor” households will save proportionally
more relative to the rich, allowing them to leave more in proportion to their wealth
bequests.
1.8 Conclusions
To conclude, this paper designated a natural mechanism linking public debt and the
inequality of wealth. Our primary concern was to evaluate the effects of the former to
the latter macroeconomic variable. In our set-up we took into consideration the likely
event that individuals across generations are linked through a particular form of altruism
and analytically showed how a bequest motive affect the life-cycle considerations of the
individuals.
Interestedly, we analytically proved that different classes or groups of people, the
relatively “rich” and the “relatively” poor, do not in general respond in the same manner
in the event of a “debt shock”. Therefore the main source of the ambiguous effects of debt
on the inequality of wealth that in general exists, comes from that particular property.
This feature it is consistent with the view that the distribution of wealth matters for
aggregate outcomes.
Moreover and limiting our analysis to labour taxes, a set of our results showed
that different tax regimes do not alter the observable outcome. Nevertheless, at microe-
conomic level the tax regime seems to matter. In the extreme case where the adjustment
in debt comes mostly through a regressive tax instrument, the qualitative responses be-
tween the “rich” and the “poor” are not the same. This in turn implies that debt
adjustments unless carefully designed might accelerate the inequality of wealth.
Finally, in some support of our results Vegh and Vuletin (2014) tested the effects
of pro-cyclical fiscal policies (i.e. proxy to an exogenous debt shock) on income inequal-
ity (a measure which is highly correlated with wealth inequality (OECD (2009)) and
documented that the first tend to exacerbate the latter. In addition, Laubach (2009)
seems to confirm that budget deficits do affect the rate of interest, hence the general
equilibrium effects of deficits (that our mechanism crucially rely on) seems to be a valid
possibility. However, we mentioned in the main text the scale of the crowding out of
capital might matter. In this respect, the assumption of a closed economy is important.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Proof for ∆ < 0
Proof. From dC3 = SDdw + wdSD. Noting that SD is a function of the interest rate
and the MPB, then dSD = SDrdr + SDxdXS . Since XS is a function of the interest
rate, we also have dXS = XSrdr. Therefore, dSD = SDrdr + SDxXSrdr. Define,
∆ = SDr + SDxXSr, substituting the expressions for all terms and using the fact that
(1 +n)XSr = Xs, someone gets ∆ =
2SDx
1+n [Xs−1] < 0 which is unambiguously negative.
If the utility is logarithmic then dSD = 0⇒ ∆ = 0. For the definitions of SDr, SDx and
XSr see Appendix 1.9.4. For further details see On-line Appendix.
1.9.2 Proof for Γ
Proof. From dC4 = XSdSD + SDdXs, using dSD = SDrdr + SDxdXS , then dC4 =
[XS∆ + SDXSr]dr. Define Γ = XS∆ + SDXSr. Using, XSr =
Xs
1+n and the definition
for Xs, we have Γ = XS
[
∆ + SDf ′
]
. So, if the utility is logarithmic ∆ = 0 ⇒ Γ > 0.
Otherwise, Γ can be of either sign. In particular, Γ > 0 iff :
∆ +
SD
f ′
> 0
Using the definition for ∆ =
2SDx
1 + n
[Xs − 1]
SD >
2SDx
1 + n
[1−Xs]f ′
1 > 2SDZ1
Where in the last steps we used SDx = (SD)
2β U
′′(Ct+1)
U ′′(Ct) (1 + n)f
′ and SD = 1Z1+1
with Z1 = β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(Ct)
[1−Xs](f ′)2. Therefore, using SD = 1Z1+1 , 1 > 2SDZ1 ⇒ SD > 12 .
The conditions in the main text follow.
1.9.3 Proof for E
Proof. From dC5 = SDd(r − n)b + (r − n)bdSD and using ∆ = − 2f ′SD(1 − SD),
dC5 = SDd(r − n)b + [(SDf ′ + ∆)f ′ − (1 + n)∆]bdr. Define E = (SDf ′ + ∆)f ′ − (1 +
n)∆ = SD + (r − n)∆. So, if the economy is dynamic inefficient this is always positive.
Otherwise, some conditions must be put. With some algebra E is also equals to E =
2SD[SD − 12 + 1+nf ′ (1 − SD)]. Define, P = SD − 12 + 1+nf ′ (1 − SD), thus if SD > 12 then
P > 0 ⇒ E > 0. Hence more investigation is required for a dynamic efficient economy
and SD <
1
2 . Consider the case SD <
1
2 and f
′ > 1+n. Then, P < 0 iff, SD < 1− 0.51− 1+n
f ′
.
Thus, if the MPS is less than SD < 1− 0.51− 1+n
f ′
< 0.5 then P < 0⇒ E < 0, otherwise, if
1− 0.5
1− 1+n
f ′
< SD <
1
2 ⇒ P > 0⇒ E > 0.
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1.9.4 Definitions and Notations
S(r,D) = saving function
X(r,S) = bequests function
SD =
∂S(r,D)
∂D
< 1
=
1
Z1 + 1
with Z1 = β(1 + rt+1)
2U
′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(1−Xs)
Sr =
∂S(r,D)
∂r
< 1
XS =
∂X(r,S)
∂s
XS ≡ (1 + n)Xs
f ′
< 1
SDr =
∂SD
∂r
< 0
= −(SD)2
[
β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(2−Xs)(1 + rt+1)
]
SDx =
∂SD
∂XS
> 0
= (SD)
2
[
β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(1 + n)(1 + rt+1)
]
XSr =
∂XS
∂r
> 0
=
Xs
1 + n
∆ = SDr + SDxXSr =
=
2SDx
1 + n
[Xs − 1] < 0
= − 2
f ′
SD(1− SD) < 0
E = SD + (r − n)∆
Γ = Xs[∆ +
SD
f ′
]
C3 = SDw
C4 = SDXS
C5 = SD(r − n)b
ΦF3 = CˆV
F
[
2
C3
− 1
C3 − C5
]
> 0
iff b <
w
2(r − n) or r < n
ΦF4 = −CˆV
F
(
1
1 + C4
) < 0
ΦF5 = −CˆV
F
(
1
C3 − C5 ) > 0
ΦP3 =
1
1 + C4
> 0
ΦP4 = −
C3 − C5
1 + C4
(
1
1 + C4
) < 0
ΦP5 = −ΦP3 < 0
dC3 = [w∆− SDk]dr
dC4 = Γdr
dC5 = SD(r − n)db+ Ebdr
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1.9.5 Optimal plans
Relative to the main paper we ignore heterogeneity and we switch the notation for
savings from at+1 to s
t
t
max
ct,ct+1,xt+1
Vt = U(ct)+βU(ct+1) + δU(xt+1) (1.47)
s.t
ct + s
t
t = Dt (1.48)
ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
t
t (1.49)
ctt > 0, c
t
t+1 > 0, xit+1 > 0 plus Inada Conditions
where Dt denotes disposable income, xt+1 is the bequest, and n population
growth. The first order conditions are:
(1 + n)βu′(ct+1) = δu′(xt+1) (1.50)
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′(ct+1) (1.51)
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Define qt+1 ≡ ct+1+(1+n)xt+1ct . From Euler equation (1.51)
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′(ct+1)⇒ (1.52)
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′
([
ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 − (1 + n)xt+1
]
ct
ct
)
⇒ (1.53)
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′ (dt+1ct − (1 + n)xt+1)⇒ (1.54)
U ′(ct)
U ′ (qt+1ct − (1 + n)xt+1) = β(1 + rt+1)⇒ (1.55)
Using (1.51) and the definition for qt+1 and rearranging
dqt+1
drt+1
rt+1
qt+1
= − U
′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct+1)(ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1)
(1.56)
where ρ ≡ rt+1qt+1 is the IES in terms of future expenditures, in the main text θ ≡ 1ρ .
It is straight forward that:
ρ = − U
′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct+1)(ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1)
= − U
′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct+1)(ct+1)
= − U
′(xt+1)
U ′′(xt+1)(xt+1)
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Properties of the Bequest function
from FOC define
Γ ≡ δU ′(xt+1)− (1 + n)βU ′(ct+1) (1.57)
Γ ≡ δU ′(xt+1)− (1 + n)βU ′ [(1 + rt+1)st − (1 + n)xt+1] (1.58)
Therefore from (1.58) the optimal bequest is an implicit function of future interest
rate and savings:
x∗t+1 = X(rt+1, st)
The main scope is to figure out the marginal propensity to bequeath out of saving
Xs =
∂x∗t+1
∂st
and the effect of interest rates Xr =
∂x∗t+1
∂rt+1
Note that Γ is an implicit function of xt+1, st, and rt+1. Therefore we can write
Γ(xt+1, st, rt+1) = δU
′(xt+1)− (1 + n)βU ′ [(1 + rt+1)st − (1 + n)xt+1] (1.59)
The partial effects of its main arguments are:
Γx ≡ ∂Γ(xt+1, st, rt+1)
∂xt+1
= δU ′′(xt+1) + (1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1) < 0 (1.60)
Γs ≡ ∂Γ(xt+1, st, rt+1)
∂s
= −(1 + n)βU ′′(ct+1)(1 + rt+1) > 0 (1.61)
Γr ≡ ∂Γ(xt+1, st, rt+1)
∂rt+1
= −(1 + n)βU ′′(ct+1)st > 0 (1.62)
By totally differentiating equation (1.59) someone gets:
dΓ(xt+1, st, rt+1) = Γxdxt+1 + Γrdrt+1 + Γsdst (1.63)
Hence the marginal effects of savings and interests rates will be given by:
Marginal Propensity to bequeath out of savings
Xs = −Γs
Γx
∣∣∣∣
dr=0
=
(1 + n)βU ′′(ct+1)(1 + rt+1)
δU ′′(xt+1) + (1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
> 0 (1.64)
Note than in principle the marginal propensity to bequeath out of savings might
exceed one. A sufficient condition for Xs < 1 is
0 < rt+1 − n < δ
β(1 + n)
U ′′(xt+1)
U ′′(ct+1)
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This condition imposes a bound on the degree of dynamic efficiency28. But, we
can define the adjusted to dynamic efficiency marginal propensity to bequeath out of
savings or the modified marginal propensity to bequeath
modified marginal propensity to bequeath
Xs = −Γs
Γx
=
(1 + n)βU ′′(ct+1)(1 + rt+1)
δU ′′(xt+1) + (1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
⇒ (1.65)
1 + n
1 + rt+1
Xs =
(1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
δU ′′(xt+1) + (1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
⇒ (1.66)
1 + n
1 + rt+1
Xs =
1[
δU ′′(xt+1)
(1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+1
< 1 (1.67)
the effects of interest rates on bequest
Xr = −Γr
Γx
∣∣∣∣
ds=0
=
(1 + n)βU ′′(ct+1)st
δU ′′(xt+1) + (1 + n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
> 0 (1.68)
Xr = −Γr
Γx
∣∣∣∣
ds=0
=
st
δU ′′(xt+1)
(1+n)βU ′′(ct+1) + (1 + n)
(1.69)
Xr = −Γr
Γx
∣∣∣∣
ds=0
=
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1)
δU ′′(xt+1)
(1+n)βU ′′(ct+1) + (1 + n)
(1.70)
Thus, from (1.70) ⇒
Xr =
kt + b
Z + 1
⇒ (1 + n)Xr = S(Dt, rt+1)
Z + 1
(1.71)
with Z = δU
′′(xt+1)
(1+n)2βU ′′(ct+1) . Also, from(1.64)
Xr =
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1)
1 + rt+1
Xs ≡ S(Dt, rt+1)
1 + rt+1
Xs (1.72)
where we used the financial markets clearing condition, (1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1) =
S(Dt, rt+1). See next for S(Dt, rt+1)
Properties of the Saving function
From FOC define as:
28In the dynamic inefficient case this condition is automatically satisfied
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Φ ≡ β(1 + rt+1)U ′(ct+1)− U ′(ct) (1.73)
Φ = β(1 + rt+1)U
′((1 + rt+1)st − (1 + n)xt))− U ′(Dt − st) (1.74)
Φ = β(1 + rt+1)U
′[(1 + rt+1)st − (1 + n)X(rt+1, st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x∗t+1
]− U ′(Dt − st) (1.75)
where in the last line we have substituted for the optimal bequest plan. From
the last line, optimal savings is an implicit function of the disposable income and the
interest rates:
s∗t = S(Dt, rt+1)
Note that Φ is an implicit function of st, Dtand rt+1. The scope is to find the
marginal propensity to save out of disposable income SD =
∂s∗t+1
∂Dt
, and the effects of
interest rates. As before, we can write:
Φ(Dt, st, rt+1) = β(1 + rt+1)U
′ [(1 + rt+1)st − (1 + n)X(rt+1, st)]− U ′(Dt − st) (1.76)
The partial effects of its main arguments are:
ΦD ≡ Φ(Dt, st, rt+1)
∂Dt
= −U ′′(ct) (1.77)
Φs ≡ Φ(Dt, st, rt+1)
∂st
= β(1 + rt+1)
2U ′′(ct+1)
[
1− 1 + n
1 + rt+1
Xs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+) from(1.67)
+U ′′(Ct) < 0 (1.78)
while
Φr ≡ ∂Φ(Dt, st, rt+1)
∂rt+1
= β
[
(1 + rt+1)U
′′(ct+1)[st − (1 + n)Xr]) + U ′(Ct+1)
]
(1.79)
= βU ′(ct+1)
[
(1 + rt+1)
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′(ct+1)
[st − (1 + n)Xr] + 1
]
(1.80)
using (1.71)
= βU ′(ct+1)
[
(1 + rt+1)
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′(ct+1)
[1− 1
Z + 1
]st + 1
]
(1.81)
= βU ′(ct+1)
[
(1 + rt+1)
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′(ct+1)
[1− 1
Z + 1
]st + 1
]
(1.82)
= βU ′(ct+1)
[
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′(ct+1)
(ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1)[1− 1
Z + 1
] + 1
]
(1.83)
= βU ′(ct+1)
[
1− θ [1− 1
Z + 1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
(1.84)
27
where −θ = U ′′(ct+1)U ′(ct+1) (ct+1 + (1 + n)xt+1) is the inverse of the IES,
The marginal propensity to save and the effects of interest rate is equal to
SD = −ΦD
Φs
∣∣∣∣
dr=0
=
1
β(1 + rt+1)2
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)] [1−
1 + n
1 + rt+1
Xs]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+1
< 1 (1.85)
Sr = −Φr
Φs
∣∣∣∣
dD=0
can be either sign (1.86)
In the normal case, Sr < 0, which implies θ > 1 + Z, with Z > 0. In this case,
the income effect dominates the substitution effect when interest rates change.
1.9.6 Debt effects
Disposable income
Dt = It + xt (1.87)
It = I(rt, τt) (1.88)
where xt is the bequest that the “young” receives and I(rt, τt) is the after tax
earnings function. Per capita taxes, τt are determined by the government’s budget
constraint. Note that the optimal plan for the bequest imply x∗t+1 = X(rt+1, st)
Factor prices, from profit maximization (neoclassical production function)
wt = f(kt)− f ′(k)k (1.89)
1 + rt = f
′ (1.90)
The financial markets clearing condition is:
(1 + n)(kt+1 + b) = S(Dt, rt+1) (1.91)
Total differentiation yields
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(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db) = SD
[
Irdrt + Iτdτt + dX(rt, st−1)
]
+ Srdrt+1
(1.92)
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db) = SD
[
Irdrt + Iτdτt + dX(rt, st−1)
]
+ Srdrt+1
(1.93)
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db) = SD
[
Irdrt + Iτdτt + dX(rt, st−1)
]
+ Srdrt+1
(1.94)
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db) = SD
[
Irdrt + Iτdτt +Xrdrt + (1 + n)Xsd(kt + b)
]
+ Srdrt+1
(1.95)
It = wt − τ ⇒ (1.96)
Ir ≡ ∂It
∂rt
= −kt It ≡ ∂It
∂τt
= −1 (1.97)
while government’s budget constraint becomes τt = (rt − n)b. Hence
dτt = (rt − n)db+ bdr (1.98)
In consequence from (1.95):
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db) = SD
[
− kdrt − (rt − n)db− bdrt+
Xrdrt + (1 + n)Xsd(kt + b)
]
+ Srdrt+1 (1.99)
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db)− Srdrt+1 = SD
[
− kdrt − (rt − n)db− bdrt
+Xrdrt + (1 + n)Xsd(kt + b)
]
(1.100)
(1 + n)(dkt+1 + db)− Srdrt+1 = SD
[
− kdrt − bdrt +Xrdrt + (1 + n)Xsd(kt)
]
+ SD
[
(1 + n)Xs − (rt − n)
]
db (1.101)
[(1 + n)− Srf ′′]dkt+1 = SD
[
− (k + b)f ′′ +Xrf ′′ + (1 + n)Xs
]
dkt+
+
[
SD
[
(1 + n)Xs − (rt − n)
]− (1 + n)]db (1.102)
Stability condition
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dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
db=0
=
SD
[
− (k + b)f ′′ +Xrf ′′ + (1 + n)Xs
]
[(1 + n)− Srf ′′] < 1 (1.103)
The effects of debt on capital
In the stationary state kt = kt+1 = k. Therefore, the effect of debt on capital,
from (1.102)
db
dk
=
[
SD
[
(1 + n)Xs − (rt − n)
]− (1 + n)]
Q
(1.104)
db
dk
=
SD
[
(1 + n)Xs −
(
f ′ − (1 + n))]− (1 + n)
Q
(1.105)
db
dk
=
SD[(1 + n)Xs − f ′] + SD(1 + n)− (1 + n)
Q
(1.106)
Therefore
db
dk
=
SD︸︷︷︸
+
[
(1 + n)Xs
f ′
− 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−) from(1.67)
f ′ + (SD − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(1 + n)
Q
< 0 (1.107)
where Q > 0 is the stability condition, assuming Sr < 0. Hence public debt
crowds out capital. The above results extend Diamond’s model with debt to account
for the ”joy-of-giving” bequest motive.
1.9.7 Welfare effects
In steady state xt+1 = xt = x. The stationary problem using the life-time budget
constraint is:
max
c1,c2,x
U = U(c1, c2, x) (1.108)
s.t
c1 +
c2
1 + r
+(n− r) x
1 + r
= I (1.109)
where c1 is the consumption of the young, and c2 the consumption of the old.
The optimal plans imply
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U ′(c2) =
U ′(c1)
1 + r
(1.110)
U ′(x) =
U ′(c1)(n− r)
1 + r
(1.111)
We now introduce heterogeneity and derive the welfare effects, for each tax sys-
tem.
Welfare Analysis: Lump-sum taxes
The life-cycle budget constraint is:
ci1 +
ci2
1 + r
+ (n− r) x
i
1 + r
= wli − τ (1.112)
the total change in budget constraint after some algebra becomes:
d(ci1)+
1
1 + r
dci2 +
n− r
1 + r
dxi =
− r − n
1 + r
(k + b)dr − (r − n)db+
[(si − S
1 + r
)
+ k(1− li)
]
dr (1.113)
The total change in utility for each individual is:
dU i(c1, c2, x) = −u′(ci1)
[
(r − n)(k + b
1 + r
dr + db) +
[
[
S
1 + r
− k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate change
in factor payments
− [ s
i
1 + r
− kli]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual change
in factor payments
]
dr
]
(1.114)
dU i(c1, c2, x)
db
= −u′(ci1)
[
(r − n) (k + b
1 + r
dr
db
+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
[
[
S
1 + r
− k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate change
in factor payments
− (1.115)
[
si
1 + r
− kli]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual change
in factor payments
]
dr
db
]
(1.116)
The effect on the average welfare is given by:
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dU(c1, c2, x)
db
= −u′(c1)
[
(r − n) (k + b
1 + r
dr
db
+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
(1.117)
The expression above replicates Diamond’s results. In other words, in the dy-
namic inefficient case higher debt increases the average family utility. With similar steps
we can arrive in the same expression and conclusion for the affine tax system.
Welfare Analysis: proportional taxes
Define τ ′ = wτli and note that τ = (r−n)bw under similar steps as before. The total
change in individual utility will be given by:
dU i(c1, c2, x) = −u′(ci1)li
[[
(r − n)db+
(
(r − n)(k + b)
1 + r
)
dr
]
−
( si
li
− S
1 + r
)
dr
]
(1.118)
The welfare effects on individual family becomes equal to:
dU i(c1, c2, x)
db
= −u′(ci1)li
[[
(r − n) +
(
(r − n)(k + b)
1 + r
)
dr
db
]
−
(
φi − S
1 + r
)
dr
db
]
(1.119)
where φi = s
i
li
. The effect on the weighted average welfare then is:
dU(c1, c2, x)
db
= −u′(c1)
[
(r − n) +
(
(r − n)(k + b)
1 + r
)
dr
db
]
(1.120)
Thus, the conclusions are the same as before.
32
Chapter 2
Optimal Taxation with Human
Capital Risk and Aggregate
Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
During recessions governmental revenues usually collapse and the balance between rising
taxes and restoring growth is hard. Effective labour, that is human capital, is essential
component of growth, hence the stabilization of public finances is not orthogonal to the
investment decisions in human capital. The latter type of asset is, however, a risky
project from individual point of view and is subject to idiosyncratic risk. A decline in
health, mortality risk or job-displacement risk are examples of negative human capital
shocks. Improvements in the labour market, on the job training or internal promotions
are examples of positive human capital shocks. Legal impediments restrict the possibility
for risk-sharing and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk induces a precautionary
savings motive.
If the government supplies the safe asset of the economy, and there exists another
asset, such as physical capital, the idiosyncratic risk to human capital affects the com-
position of investments between, bonds, physical and human capital and by implication
economic growth. The optimal manipulation of fiscal instruments then, will eventually
determine the efficient path for growth. Therefore the main motivation and contribu-
tion of this paper is to study an optimal taxation problem within an endogenous growth
model where the government in order to supply the safe asset (risk-free bond) taxes
physical and human capital subject to idiosyncratic risk.
The share of human capital in individual portfolio is large, and the role of idiosyn-
cratic human capital risk has being validated in the empirical literature only recently.
For example, in Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) the portfolio share of human capital
wealth is between 0.77 %-0.8 % and similarly in Huggett and Kaplan (2015) is no less
than 50 % over the life-cycle of a college graduate. The latter authors also document
that a substantial amount of uninsurable human capital risk exists. Due to this riskiness
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the returns in human capital usually command a substantial premium over other assets
(Palacios-Huerta (2003)). On the other hand, the assumption that the government bond
is a risk-free asset, it also covers the equally likely empirical case. For instance, Marcet
and Scott (2009) showed the behaviour of public debt inherit characteristics that are
mostly attributed to a non-state contingent bond1. Accordingly, the spanning of the
synthetic pay-off matrix of returns that is chosen as a basis for our analysis, has a
reasonable degree of realism.
Our framework builds on Krebs (2006, 2003a) who extends the endogenous
growth model of Jones and Manuelli (1990) to incomplete markets, on Toda (2014b)
who generalizes these class of “Krebs” models in terms of preferences and the num-
ber of assets and on Gottardi et al. (2014b) who include a government sector. In our
paper we further develop these class of models in two primary dimensions. The first
one is methodological the second one quantitative. More specifically for the latter con-
tribution, we show how to solve a Samuelson-Merton portfolio choice problem under
borrowing constraints.
Gottardi et al. (2014b) were the first to study an optimal taxation and debt
problem when human capital is subject to idiosyncratic risk but abstract from aggre-
gate uncertainty. This assumption, however, we believe is restrictive in two important
dimensions. Firstly, random disturbances do affect the economy, as for instance, the
recent financial crisis proved. Secondly, it restricts the pay-off matrix of returns be-
tween government bonds and physical capital to be collinear. The latter simplification
relegates government bonds to be no different from interest bearing money. Therefore
the provision of such bonds is determined by a simple arbitrage argument between bor-
rowing costs and the rate of economic growth resembling in this sense what Diamond
(1965) first taught us.
In contrast in our framework the provision of non-state contingent bond and
the idiosyncratic risk to human capital it creates an oxymoron trade-off similar to the
one first Shin (2006) pointed. To the extent that the reference point is idiosyncratic
uncertainty, higher insurance against that risk it implies that individuals want to lend
to the government, but higher insurance against the aggregate risk it is the government
that wants to lend to the consumers. There are three however fundamental differences
between our paper and the exposition in Shin (2006). First, he focuses on endowment
risk while our focus is on investment risk. Second, he abstracts from the role of prices
and therefore from other forms of insurance while in our case we don’t. Third, the
distribution of assets in his paper matters but in our case does not. In this respect, we
view our arguments here as complements. Nevertheless, our main argument highlights
the pitfalls that the proposition of Shin (2006) might hide and in particular the role of
prices as an insurance mechanism2.
In our methodology, the taxes and allocations by the planner are engineered in
1This argument also extends to multiple maturities, see Faraglia et al. (2014a).
2Our communication with Shin revealed that the author proceeded to a major overhaul of his 2006
paper. Sadly, the new version is not yet in a state to be circulated. Therefore under this reservation our
reflections is based on his 2006 manuscript.
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way akin to a “Ramsey planner”. That is, for the exogenously specified instruments,
the planner calculates the “best” path of those instruments such as to maximize the
welfare for each agent. For simplicity we assume a linear taxation problem, where
the government taxes the returns of the physical assets. However, in contrast to the
tradition in the optimal fiscal policy literature, we assume partial commitment. This
type of equilibrium is by construction time-consistent although the implicit assumption
here is that the commitment of each government does not extend beyond one period.
This assumption serves two main purposes, first predetermined policies and in particular
taxes restrict any government to complete the markets, and second it can be though as
a reasonable approximation to the commitment technology that occurs in practice.
Furthermore, to retain tractability the model features three crucial assumptions:
a) The investment in human capital is viewed as a cost rather than time investment,
therefore we abstract from any labour-leisure trade-off and focus on effective labour
hours, b) the constant returns to scale production function in physical and human
capital and c) idiosyncratic risk is not a relevant state variable. The last assumption
lead to a solution where aggregation is exact, but beside this abstraction idiosyncratic
risk still matters. As we will show the presence of idiosyncratic risk to human capital
affects agents’ asset valuations and thus the price of aggregate risk. In consequence
this type of risk does not lose its relevance for the design of policies. The assumption
of unpredictable idiosyncratic risk in turn implies that the solution to the economy of
heterogeneous agents is also the solution to the problem of one agent facing two types
of uninsurable risks.
Turning on our main findings, the solution of the optimal plans is isomorphic
to case where the planner becomes a “Wall Street” investor by taking the command
of a large stock market. The planner then, assembles his portfolio by trading assets
of different productivity and insurance properties. Limiting our analysis to the special
case of logarithmic utility his objective becomes equivalent in maximizing the after
tax portfolio returns. To achieve this objective, the planner replaces the conceptual
single agent and tries to allocate his portfolio shares in way that is an optimal response
against the effective uncertainty, that of uninsurable aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
Since these two types of risks determine the composition of the investments and the
fluctuations of prices, the optimal allocation mimics the behaviour of agents who tries
to protect his most risky investment. Our results are organized around this particular
insight.
For the government it is optimal to accumulate assets. That is provide liquidity
or be the net lender of the economy. This is optimal in our framework for two reasons
a) due to the fiscal hedging needs to secure revenues against the aggregate uncertainty
b) because idiosyncratic shocks are permanent events. For public policy this implies
that government debt is an imperfect mean for self-insure. This particular proposition
is strengthened under our special case of log utility. In this specific case, agents are
approximately “risk neutral” and borrowing by the government in order to leverage
human capital is an optimal response. The government in return will accommodate this
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through a reallocation of physical assets in way that protect its returns. The policy
prescription then uncovers the first principles of public finances where less productive
sources of income are subsidised and the risky ones insured. That is physical capital
must be subsidised while human capital be taxed. Accordingly, the engine of growth
comes through an efficient allocation of resources in the most productive asset. This
particular insight determines the optimal path in the event of a negative productivity
shock or a “stock Market crash”. Front loading human capital in the short run and
protecting its returns along the transition to the new growth path achieves an effective
mean to promote welfare and stabilize the public finances.
2.2 Related Literature
A voluminous literature on the optimal taxes and government debt addressed similar
concerns. An extensive survey goes beyond the scope of this project and therefore the
focus will be directed to the most relevant ones. Chamley (1986) within a standard
optimal growth model and its extension by Judd (1985) to heterogeneous agents, both
showed that the tax on physical capital should be zero in the long-run. Jones et al.
(1997) argue that similar result applies to human capital. Aiyagari (1995) was the
first to study an optimal capital tax problem within an environment when markets
are incomplete. Abstracting from any aggregate uncertainty and in contrast to earlier
studies he finds that physical capital should be taxed in the long-run. As Reis and
Panousi (2012) showed, the former result it might also survive in a different form of
market incompleteness where entrepreneurs are subject to investment risk. Their result
however depends on the degree of financial deepness.
Barro (1979) was the first to conjecture the property of public debt as shock
absorber and its ability to smooth taxes over time. However, in a context where the
government has instruments sufficient enough to insure against aggregate risk, Lucas and
Stokey (1983) delimited the argument of Barro (1979), but later in Aiyagari et al. (2002)
his insights were reinstated. Zhu (1992) extended the result in Chamley (1986) to the
case of uncertainty, while Chari et al. (1994) quantitative assess those in a business cycle
model. Similarly, Farhi (2010) extends the stochastic growth model to the case of non-
state contingent bond, while Karantounias (2013) generalize it to recursive preferences
although he maintains the assumption of complete markets.
Finally, Bassetto (2014) extends the environment of Lucas and Stokey (1983) to
include heterogeneous agents and effectively studies how pareto weights influence the
optimal labour tax responses of the planner to expenditures and other shocks. Werning
(2007) also considers the complete markets economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983), but
extends it to include heterogeneous agents, accumulation of physical assets and lump-
sump taxes unrestricted in sign and characterizes the optimal allocations and distortions
in this economy. Bhandari et al. (2013) retain an environment where agents have pre-
cautionary savings, but in contrast to this paper, they first abstract from any physical
assets and second they focus on idiosyncratic labour endowments while in our case we
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focus on effective labour.
2.3 Model
The model considers an economy of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Time is dis-
crete and is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2.... The economy consists of three types of agents, a
continuum of infinite lived consumers of measure one indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], a single repre-
sentative firm and a government. There is one (homogeneous and non-perishable) good
in the economy produced by a neoclassical technology, F . The firm employs physical
capital Kt and human capital Ht to produce Yt units of output. Human capital should be
thought in terms of units per effective labour. Labour endowments are inelastically sup-
plied and for simplicity are normalized to one. Therefore, the accumulation of efficiency
units of labour and human capital is used interchangeably and it is the source of growth
in this model3. The markets for hiring human and physical capital are competitive. The
production function is further assumed to be of CRS with standard (neoclassical) as-
sumptions. In total, the production function is calibrated as Yt = AtK
α
t H
1−α
t , where At
is the total factor productivity. Each period the firm hires human and physical capital
up to point where profits are maximized. The optimality conditions for the firm are:
rt = Fkt (2.1)
wt = Fht (2.2)
where rt and the wt are the returns for physical and human capital and Fkt , Fht
their respective marginal products. At is a source of aggregate uncertainty and is cal-
ibrated to follow an AR(1) process. TFP shocks rule out the returns of bonds and
physical capital to be collinear. The law of motion for the productivity shocks is:
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + (1− ρ) log A¯+ eAt eAt ∼ N(0, σ2A) (2.3)
ρ is the degree of persistence of the TFP shocks and A¯ its mean. The govern-
ment in order to finance a random path of (unproductive) government spending, raises
revenues through taxes on physical and human capital income and issues the (short-
lived) risk-free asset of the economy. We let τkt and τ
w
t be the marginal tax rates of
those incomes. Taxes on both capital goods are assumed to be announced one period in
advance. Section 2.4 discusses in some detail the particular measurability assumption.
Sluggishness in the legislation process could justify this inertia in fiscal policy.
Individuals on the other hand accumulate, physical and human capital according
to the following laws of motion:
3The model, as first developed by Krebs (2006), is an Incomplete Markets version of the special class
of convex growth models, as for instance in Alvarez and Stokey (1998), Jones and Manuelli (1990) or
King and Rebelo (1990). See Acemoglu (2009, p.393) for the preliminaries.
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Phsyical capital: kit+1 = Iikt + (1− δ)kit (2.4)
Human capital: hit+1 = Iiht + (1− δit)hit (2.5)
where kit and hit are the stocks of physical and human capital respectively,
Iikt , Iiht the equivalent investments in those assets, δ
i
t is the idiosyncratic depreciation
shock to human capital and δ the depreciation rate of physical capital. For simplicity,
as in Krebs (2003b) we assume that δit = δ + ηit > −1 where ηit is a normal random
variable identically and independently distributed across individuals and time with the
mean normalized to zero and some variance σ2η. Idiosyncratic shocks is further assumed
not to cause any fluctuations on the aggregate and hence are uncorrelated with the
macroeconomic shocks. Individuals, use their human capital to work for the firm and
lend their physical asset to earn interest. In dynamic programming form the maximiza-
tion problem of the consumers is4:
V it (xit) = max
cit,bit+1,kit+1,hit+1
[
exp
(
(1− β) log cit + βEt log
[
V it+1(xit+1)
])]
(2.6)
s.t
cit + bit+1 + kit+1 + hit+1 = R
f
t−1bit +R
k
t kit +R
i
thit + T
i
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
xit
(2.7)
xit ≥ 0 (2.8)
ki0, hi0, bi0 given
Rf−1 = R
f
0 , τ
k
−1 = τ
k
0 , τ
w
−1 = τ
w
0 given (2.9)
where Rkt ≡ 1 + (1 − τkt )rt − δ is the gross rate of return of physical capital
net of taxes, Rit ≡ 1 + (1 − τwt )wt − δ + ηit is the equivalent idiosyncratic returns from
human capital. Consumers also have the option to invest into a safe bond supplied
by the government. One unit of bonds purchased in period t delivers Rft units next
period. The time index follows the definition for the risk free asset when no re-selling
(or pay-back) is possible 5. In addition, agents might receive a lump-sum amount of
transfers T it ≡ τtbit + τtkit + τthit proportional to their investments. Their purpose will
become clear in later sections. The variable xit is the returns inclusive wealth of the
consumers which we assume is positive. This assumption ensures that the solution to
the maximization problem exists. We can think of this condition as a natural borrowing
limit that does not bind for all agents, periods and histories.
An additional remark is in order. Assuming that the interpretation of the id-
4we consider the Bellman equation a special case of the class of recursive (Epstein-Zin) preferences
described in Toda (2014b). The coefficient, 1− β ensures the value function being homothetic.
5The standard relationship between the returns of the risk-free bond and its value is Rft ≡ 1QtRecall
the definition of returns for any asset between t − 1 and t, is Rt = Pt+DtPt−1 , where Pt is the price of
reselling that asset in the current period, and Dt the dividend payment. For the risk free asset, the
dividend payments is assumed to be constant and normalized to one.
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iosyncratic shock is a particular loss of skills of a worker, then the wage rate paid in
period t, we can think of it as the permanent wage differential before and after the event
that led to that particular loss (e.g job-displacement). Empirically, this kind of wage dif-
ferential is large (See Neal (1995), Topel (1991) or Jacobson et al. (1993)). However, the
implicit assumption of this interpretation is that we effectively abstract for any wages
forgone within the period of, for example, unemployment. It is instructive to derive the
FOCs of the problem in (2.6). Those will only have an instrumental role for some of the
proofs that follow. In particular the optimal conditions are:
(cit)
−1 = βEt
[
(cit+1)
−1Rkt+1
]
(2.10)
(cit)
−1 = βEt
[
(cit+1)
−1Rit+1
]
(2.11)
(cit)
−1 = βEt
[
(cit+1)
−1]Rft (2.12)
To solve the model, is more convenient to convert consumers’ problem into a
standard portfolio choice allocation in three assets. In the sequence, we will use the
following definitions:
Total Investments: sit+1 = bit+1 + kit+1 + hit+1 (2.13)
Share of debt: φit =
bit+1
sit+1
(2.14)
Share of physical capital: θkit+1 =
kit+1
sit+1
(2.15)
Share of human capital: θhit+1 =
hit+1
sit+1
(2.16)
Accounting Balance: φit+1 + θ
k
it+1 + θ
h
it+1 = 1 (2.17)
Using the above definitions, the budget constraint of the individuals can be con-
verted to:
xit+1 = Rixt+1(xit − cit) (2.18)
Proof. The returns inclusive wealth in period t by construction is xit ≡ Rft−1bit+Rkt kit+
Rithit, substituting the definitions of the previous expression becomes xit = (R
f
t−1φit +
Rkt θ
k
it + R
i
tθ
h
it)sit, thus the budget constraint can also be written as cit + sit+1 = xit or
sit+1 = xit − cit. Future wealth, by definition is xit+1 = Rxit+1sit+1, substituting for
savings we get the equation in (2.18), where Rixt+1 ≡ Rft φit+1 + Rkt+1θkit+1 + Rit+1θhit+1
are the idiosyncratic gross portfolio returns net of taxes.
In the transformed problem, agents maximize (2.6) subject to (2.18) and (2.17),
where in the maximization problem asset levels are replaced by their respective shares
and the maximization problem becomes a standard Samuelson (1969)-Merton (1969)
portfolio choice problem in three assets. The solution to consumers problem is summa-
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rized by the lemma below:
Lemma 2 Assuming individual shocks do not enter the information set of the agents,
a semi-closed solution with symmetric portfolio shares exist and is defined recursively as
follows:
Modified Euler / Welfare : log νt = κ+ βEt[log νt+1] + βEt[logRxit+1 ] (2.19)
Consumption: cit = (1− β)xit (2.20)
Total investments: sit+1 = βxit (2.21)
Plan for bonds: bit+1 = βφt+1xit (2.22)
Plan for Physical Capital: kit+1 = βθ
k
t+1xit (2.23)
Plan for Human Capital: hit+1 = βθ
h
t+1xit (2.24)
Growth of individual Wealth: xit+1 = Rixt+1βxit (2.25)
Euler (2.10): 1 = Et
[
R−1xit+1R
k
t+1
]
(2.26)
Euler (2.11): 1 = Et
[
R−1xit+1R
i
t+1
]
(2.27)
Euler (2.12): 1 = Et
[
R−1xit+1
]
Rft (2.28)
Market clearing: φt+1 = 1− θkt+1 − θht+1 ∀t, St (2.29)
where κ in (2.19) is an unimportant constant.
Proof. See Appendix 2.8.1.
Notice, in the above lemma we have dropped the individual index on the shares of
assets. This is a direct consequence of the homothetic preferences and the assumption
of unpredictable, and thus permanent, idiosyncratic shocks. The latter assumption
it is consistent with a large body of empirical evidence found in the literature. For
instance, in Deaton and Paxson (1994) consumption inequality, within a given cohort,
increases over the life-cycle. This patter can be naturally supported by a permanent
idiosyncratic component in individual consumption process. More recently Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) or Storesletten et al. (2007) among others, empirically document a
similar permanent uninsurable risk to individual earnings. Accordingly, the assumption
of unpredictable idiosyncratic risk although it seems strong, is not completely unrealistic.
On the other hand, the construction of symmetric portfolio shares has being
analysed extensively in the literature and goes back to the “no trade” result of Con-
stantinides and Duffie (1996). Intuitively, the marginal value of income is independent
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of individual wealth and in consequence every consumer, unable to extract information
from idiosyncratic state, will choose the same portfolio share. For a recursive equilib-
rium to exist, it entails that each agent lives in autarky. It is immediate then that the
model is equivalent to the solution of one agent facing two different types of shocks.
Since the framework builds on Toda (2014b) and Krebs (2003a, 2006) rigorous proofs
can be found therein.
Idiosyncratic Risk Matters: Equations (2.26)-(2.28) can be combined to get the
standard arbitrage equations of CAPM models.
Et
[
mi
t+1
]
Rft = Et
[
mi
t+1
Rkt+1
]
⇒ (2.30)
Et
[
Rkt+1
]−Rft = −Cov(mit+1, Rkt+1)Et[mit+1 ]
Et
[
mi
t+1
Rit+1
]
= Et
[
mi
t+1
Rkt+1
]
(2.31)
where mit+1 ≡ R−1xit+1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) or the pricing
kernel. This definition it implicitly assumes that the prices of assets rely on the objective
probabilities of each state. An alternative definition which corrects for the risk-attitude
of the consumers is to express the pricing of assets in terms of risk-adjusted or risk-
neutral probabilities. This can happen in our example if we define the SDF to be
m∗it+1 ≡
R−1xit+1
Et[R
−1
xit+1
]
. Notice also that the discount factor depends only on ηit+1 and not
on its value in the previous period. This property has two pleasant reverberations:
a) the risk-free rate is identical across agents and b)if physical capital was owned by
firms no disagreement would exist about the objective of the firm even if markets are
incomplete. Jointly these two imply that for discounting we can use the pricing kernel
of any agent.
Equation (2.30) proves that in general idiosyncratic risk matters. All else being
equal, an increase in idiosyncratic risk will reduce investment in human capital, θh, and
increase θk (and φ). This reallocation of portfolio choices affects the composition of
investments and thus factor prices. Then, by the second line in (2.30) idiosyncratic risk
affects the risk-premium (through mi) and thus the price of assets. In Krueger and
Lustig (2010) idiosyncratic risk seems irrelevant for the pricing of assets. However, their
assumption of exchange economy seems to be strong. In fact Toda (2014a) showed that
their result relies on the number of aggregate shocks. However, the latter is isomorphic
to the case of endogenous factor prices. Since policies are in essence affected by the price
of aggregate risk, idiosyncratic shocks indeed provide the additional bite for their design.
The next proposition summarizes the main components of the preceding discussion.
Proposition 1 Individual consumption and labour income conditional on the aggre-
gate state follow an approximate random walk, while agents under the assumption of
logarithmic utility are approximately “risk neutral”.
Proof. From Lemma 2 individual consumption growth is cit+1cit =
xit+1
xit
= Rxit+1 taking
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logs and using the approximation log(Rxit+1) ≈ At+1 + η˜it+1 (2.29) we get
log cit+1 ≈ log cit +At+1 + η˜it+1 (2.32)
Similarly, define yit ≡ w˜thit as the after tax labour income so that the growth
rate of the income process is yit+1yit =
θt+1
θt
xit+1
xit
= θt+1θt Rxit+1 . Taking logs and using the
same approximation for the gross portfolio returns, the labour income process is:
log yit+1 ≈ log yit + Gt+1 + η˜it+1 (2.33)
where At+1 ≡ (Rft − 1− δ)φt+1 + w˜t+1θht+1 + r˜t+1θkt+1 and
η˜it+1 ≡ ηit+1θht+1, Gt+1 = At+1 +log( w˜t+1θt+1w˜tθt ) and w˜t+1, r˜t+1 are the after tax prices.
Proposition 1 delivers some strong policy implications and will become the basis
for our analysis and the interpretation given in the subsequent sections. First, under
the special case of the log utility the marginal value of wealth (equivalent to the coeffi-
cient νt) is independent from the individual consumption process. Comparing with the
more conventional growth models, this case is similar but not identical to a risk-neutral
agent. However since idiosyncratic risk still matters and it affects the composition of
investments, policies then will determine the efficient path of growth. Therefore, con-
sumption smoothing under the special case of log utility is replaced by an intertemporal
problem between “allocating growth” across time and inratemporal one by allocating
investments within each period.
Furthermore, the logarithmic random walk in the labour income it confirms that
idiosyncratic shocks are permanent events. This implies that government debt although
desirable is an ineffective or imperfect mean for self-insurance. In addition, the assump-
tion of non-contingent bond implies that insurance against the aggregate state is also
missing. Since idiosyncratic risk matters, fluctuations in prices (implicit in the term
Gt+1) they do have welfare effects. For instance, the real source for the important wel-
fare effects of business cycles that Krebs (2003a) found in his paper, can be reasonably
attributed to the inefficient price levels along the cycle.
2.3.1 Aggregate equilibrium
The assumptions of the model leads to solutions that are linear in wealth, therefore the
distribution of wealth is not a relevant state variable and aggregation is exact. Market
clearing conditions and lemma (2) imply:
∫ 1
0
cit d(i) = Ct,
∫ 1
0
kit d(i) = Kt,
∫ 1
0
hit d(i) = Ht,
∫ 1
0
bit d(i) = Bt ⇒ (2.34)
Ct = (1− β)Xt, Bt+1 = βφt+1Xt, Ht+1 = βθht+1Xt, Kt+1 = βθkt+1Xt (2.35)
Aggregate wealth then evolves as:
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Xt+1 ≡ Et[xit+1] = Et[Rxit+1 ]βXt (2.36)
Equation (2.36) is a novel application of the law of large number where for large
economies averages converge to their means and βEt[Rxit+1 ] is the endogenous growth
rate. The budget constraint of the government is
Bt+1 + τ
k
t rtKt + τ
w
t wtHt ≥ Rft−1Bt +Gt (2.37)
We also assume a simple rule for government spending of the form Gt = gtβXt−1,
which states that the government is consuming a time varying fraction of aggregate
wealth. The purpose of this rule is to render the solution well defined6. Beside the TFP
shocks, the time-varying fraction gt ∈ (0, 1) is another source of aggregate uncertainty
and follows the law of motion in equation (2.38) below.
log gt = ρg log gt−1 + (1− ρg) log g¯ + egt egt ∼ N(0, σ2g) (2.38)
where ρg is the degree of persistence and g¯ is the mean of the process. As in
Aiyagari et al. (2002) define the surplus (net of interest payments, Rf ≡ 1 + rft ) of
the government as, St = τkt rtKt + τwt wtHt − Gt − rft Bt so that the budget constraint
can be also re-written as Bt ≤ St + Bt+1. If this constraint holds with inequality
we let the difference be an equally shared between the investments of the household
lump-sum amount Tt ≡ τtBt + τtHt + τtKt, returned back to them. That possibility
might arise when the precautionary motive of the government is so strong that, the
buffer stock of assets accumulated the period before, Bt, might be sufficiently high to
accommodate any random disturbance7. The equality between transfers is done for
simplicity and it guarantees to leave the Euler equations unaffected. As in the case
of government expenses, proportionality to investments is essential for the existence of
equilibria. Notice that the market clearing condition implies
∫ i
0 T
i
t d(i) = Tt.
From Lemma 2 and (2.35), (2.34) , the implementality constraint for the govern-
ment is:
φt+1βRxt ≥ Rft−1φt + gt − τkt rtθkt − τwt wtθht (2.39)
B ≤Rft φt+1 ≤ B, (2.40)
where Rxt ≡ Et−1[Rxit ] is growth rate in the current period. Finally, I also
assume that the government is subject to some ad hoc debt limits of the form B ≤
Rft φt+1 ≤ B where B,B are arbitrary constants8. This assumption closely follows Farhi
6For an equilibrium to exist in this framework it requires multiplicative shocks to investment deci-
sions, unless this rule on government spending is not imposed no equilibrium exists. An alternative rule
could be the more intuitive Gt = gtYt. we chose the one in the main text for two main reasons, first to
restrict the planner to directly affect his revenues through output and second for analytical convenience.
7In general this possibility of transfers cannot be ruled out whenever a non-state contingent bond is
traded, see for example Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p.517-518) and the discussion there in.
8For an extensive discussion about the role of imposing similar constraint under incomplete markets,
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(2010) or Faraglia et al. (2014b) who in the context of Incomplete markets -missing
insurance for the aggregate risk- they impose similar debt limits. The motivation for
the particular form of the debt limits is to ensure the growth of wealth to be positive.
The scope of the lower bound is to restrict the government financing all of its expenses
by accumulating assets and the upper bound rules out Ponzi-schemes9.
The feasibility constraint then implies that the resources left from production
are divided between consumption of the private sector, consumption for the government
and investments in the capital goods.
Ct +Kt+1 +Ht+1 +Gt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt + (1− δ)Ht (2.41)
Definition 3 For given xi0, policies {τwt , τkt }∞t=0 and exogenous processes
{gt, At, ηit}∞t=0, a (stationary) competitive equilibrium with unpredictable idiosyncratic
risk is a collections of returns {rt, wt, Rft }∞t=0, such as equations (2.39), (2.40) are sat-
isfied, the financial market clearing condition (2.29) holds, asset shares are chosen op-
timally (2.30), (2.31) firms maximize profits rt = Fkt(θ
k
t , θ
h
t ), wt = Fht(θ
k
t , θ
h
t ) ∀ t
and the individual welfare, allocations and growth of assets are determined by equations
(2.19)-(2.25).
2.4 Planner’s Problem
We take a utilitarian social welfare function, where each agent is equally valued. More
formally, the welfare function is:
E0
[∫ 1
0
V i0 (xi0) d(i)
]
= E0
[
ν0
∫ 1
0
xi0 d(i)
]
(2.42)
in (2.42) we used the solution for the Bellman equation, V (xit) = νtxit (See
Appendix 2.8.1 ). Recall that xi0 is given. We also normalize
∫ 1
0 ηi0hi0 = 0 and assume
τk−1 = τk0 , τw−1 = τw0 , R
f
−1 = R
f
0 = 1. The latter assumption is common in the literature
and its purpose is to restrict the planner to use this period in his advantage by taxing
assets that are inelastically supplied. From equation (2.42) it is clear that life time
utility is maximized if the welfare coefficient ν0, common across agents, is maximized in
every period and contingencies.
Since log νt is a monotone transformation of νt, the ordinal ranking of welfare is
not affected. To determine a particular objective function for the planner we use the law
of motion for the welfare coefficient, log νt = k+βEt[log(Rxit+1)]+βEt[log νt+1], and solve
forwards. Omitting the unimportant constant k, assuming that β < 1, lim
t→∞ |νt| < ∞
see Faraglia et al. (2014a,b). In Krebs and Wilson (2004) the authors discuss that some borrowing con-
straints might be necessary for an equilibrium to exist. Toda (2014b) made that argument more formal
and his semi-closed solutions that we used in Appendix for the consumers problem, allows arbitrary
constraints in borrowing and lending. In practice no solution was possible without those constraints.
9Technically, no solution to the maximization problem can exist unless some borrowing constraints
are imposed.
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and imposing the transvesality condition lim
T→∞
βt+T
Et[log νt+T+1] = 0, the solution to this stochastic difference equation implies the follow-
ing objective for the planner:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt+1Et[logRxit+1 ] (2.43)
In other words, the life-time welfare of each agent is maximized when the certainty
equivalent of the (log of the) gross portfolio returns, Et[logRxit+1 ], is maximized in every
period and up to the infinite future. Notice how under the special case of the log utility
the results in Proposition 1 are passed in the objective of the planner. Managing an
efficient path for portfolio returns is equivalent to allocate a rate of growth for individual
wealth. Comparing with standard financial models, this is very similar to an agent
that obtains utility by “consuming his wealth”. The instruments of the government to
manage the composition of investments are the risk-free rate and the taxes on physical
and human capital.
In general and in any model involving policy decisions and rational expectations,
current equilibrium is a function of the present state, the policy decisions in this state,
and future policy actions. Since the competitive equilibrium is indexed by the chosen
policies, consumers to evaluate the future need only to know a consistent rule for those
policies. For analytical and computational tractability we focus on partial commitment
equilibria which by construction are time-consistent. In particular we extend the ap-
proach taken in Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) where each government inherits the tax and
policy rates of the previous one, it observes the current realization of shocks and an-
nounces the new policies for the next period. It is implicitly assumed next period’s gov-
ernment does not renege on these policies. Individuals then take these announcements as
given and simultaneously choose their investment plans. The minimal state vector that
captures this type of institutional commitment mechanism then is Xt =
[
θt, τt, gt, At]
where θ = [θkt , θ
h
t , φt] and τt = [R
f
t−1, τ
k
t , τ
w
t ]. Therefore the vector of policies that the
current government is choosing is pit = [R
f
t τ
k
t+1 τ
w
t+1].
There is an additional reason for the tax decisions to be predetermined. In
the optimal fiscal policy literature under full commitment, state contingent taxes on
investment decisions allows the planner to complete the markets. This result was first
established in Zhu (1992) and invoked in Chari et al. (1994). In our model where human
capital is viewed as an additional investment, a state contingent tax for this plan can
equally replicate the complete markets outcome. A formal proof of this claim can be
found in Appendix 2.8.2. In these circumstance when a non-state contingent bond is
traded none of the succeeding governments has the ability to use the fiscal instruments
in order to insure against the aggregate fluctuations. The maximization problem of the
planner can be formally stated as:
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max
∆t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt+1Et[logRxit+1 ] (2.44)
s.t
Et
[
R−1ixt+1(1 + (1−τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ)
]
=
Et
[
R−1ixt+1(1 + (1−τwt+1)Fh(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ + ηit+1)
]
∀t
(2.45)
Et
[
R−1ixt+1(1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ)
]
= Et
[
R−1ixt+1
]
Rft ∀t (2.46)
Financial markets clearing: φt+1 + θ
k
t+1 + θ
h
t+1 = 1 ∀t (2.47)
Gov. Budget Constraint: φt+1βRxt ≥ Rft−1φt + gt
− τkt Fkθkt − τwt FHθht (2.48)
Ad hoc borrowing constraint B ≤ Rft φt+1 ≤ B (2.49)
Due to Walras’ law the feasibility constraint can be omitted10. Idiosyncratic port-
folio returns in their respective transformations have a triple role, a) in their monotonic
transformation, logRxit+1 , they affect welfare, b) in their transformation R
−1
xit+1 they de-
termine the stochastic discount factor and c) in Rxt ≡ Et−1[Rxit ] they affect the growth
rate. It is obvious then that the choice vector ∆t = [φt+1, θ
k
t+1, θ
h
t+1, R
f
t , τ
k
t+1, τ
w
t+1] di-
rectly affects all three simultaneously. That feature it essentially originates from the
semi-closed solution that the model admits. For this reason and to avoid tedious rep-
etition we put more effort to analyse some of the FOCs more thoroughly than others.
In any case, most of them they have, if not identical, very similar interpretation. To
reserve space for the main text the complete derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
The maximization problem in (2.44) can be solved by forming the Lagrangian11.
We next attach the multipliers, βt+1Ψ1, β
t+1Ψ2, β
t+1Λ and βt+1λt for (2.45),(2.46),
(2.47) and (2.48) respectively. Similarly, we attach βt+1ξL and β
t+1ξU for the borrowing
constraints in (2.49). The Lagrangian of the problem then is:
10Recall that individual consumption and the budget constraints have already being substituted in
the original FOCs of the competitive economy to get the constraints (2.45)-(2.46).
11In Ramsey problems the timeless perspective usually arises when the constrains or the objective in
the initial period problem are different from any t ≥ 1. For example the marginal utility in a standard
Euler equation is not defined at t = −1. In our case, the (endogenous) growth rate might not be defined.
However, when φ−1 = φ0, τk−1 = τ
k
0 , τ
w
−1 = τ
w
0 , R
f
−1 = R
f
0 then this distinction is not applicable and
does not matter in practice, at least for the special case of logarithmic utility. Thus, we can replace the
initial value of the growth rate the average gross portfolio returns at t = 0.
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max
∆t
L = E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
[
βt+1Et[logRxit+1 ] (2.50)
−βt+1Ψ1
(
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τwt+1)Fh(θkt+1, θht+1)− (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1) + ηit+1
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M1
−βt+1Ψ2
(
R−1ixt+1
(
(1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ)−Rft
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M2
−βt+1Λ(φt+1 + θkt+1 + θht+1 − 1)
+βt+1λt
(
Rft−1φt + gt − τkt Fkθkt − τwt FHθht − φt+1βRxt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M3
+βt+1ξL(R
f
t φt+1 − B) + βt+1ξU (B −Rft φt+1)
]}
(2.51)
M1 andM2 are functions of the control variables in period t, i.eMj =Mj(∆t)
for j = 1, 2 thus the multipliers attached on those constraints remain static (for conve-
nience we suppressed the time-subscript for M1,M2,M3 in period t). Put more simply,
the objective and the static multipliers on investment decisions imply an intra-temporal
decision problem that the planner faces. More specifically, it induces a trade off be-
tween taxing assets which are not only of different productivities but also of distinct
insurance characteristics. To get some intuition on the mechanics of the model, consider
for instance the optimal choice for τwt+1:
τwt+1: Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂τwt+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB
= Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂τwt+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂τwt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Portfolio Reallocation Term
−Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τwt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare Term︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC
(2.52)
The multiplier λt represents the marginal need for funds by the government.
Since taxes are predetermined, in this example, the need for funds arises for next period.
Therefore, in (2.52) the LHS is the marginal benefit of raising one unit of extra revenue
through taxes on human capital and the RHS is the respective total marginal cost, at
the optimum the two must be equal. Marginal costs consists of two main components:
a) a portfolio reallocation component and b) a welfare cost component. An increase
in taxes causes a reallocation of investments for two main reasons. First, because the
after tax returns for the particular investment changes and second because the pricing
kernel changes. In either case the effective change is on the equilibrium price levels. Put
simply, a change in tax will trigger a portfolio rebalancing between investment in assets
47
and the demand for insurance12.
The multipliers Ψ1 and Ψ2, play the role of specific weights (determined endoge-
nously) that the planner uses for the reallocation of investments13. In equilibrium these
weights are in principle implicit functions of the elasticities of the physical asset shares
with respect to their taxes. Thus, depending on the responsiveness of the asset shares
to their respective taxes, the optimal tax rate is affected in analogous way. This kind of
responsiveness would be internalized in the equilibrium values of these multipliers.
Equation (2.52) can be written in a form that emphasizes the two competing
motives, that of fiscal hedging and that of self-insurance. On one hand the Government
tries to insure itself from the risk of aggregate shocks, on the other hand, and as long
as the objective is the individual welfare maximization, the planner will also try to
provide the necessary insurance that agents need due to idiosyncratic risk. This is
equivalent to Shin (2006)’s point of a battle between tax and consumption smoothing.
More specifically, equation (2.52) can be decomposed as follows:
βCov(λt+1,
∂M3t+1
∂τwt+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fiscal Hedging
(2.53)
= Ψ1Cov(m
i
t+1,
∂PHt+1
∂τwt+1
) + Ψ1Cov(PHt+1,
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
) + Ψ2Cov(PKt+1,
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Self-insurance
+ M˜C - M˜B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Planner’s Term
(2.54)
Where
P˜Ht+1 ≡ (1− τwt+1)Fht+1 − (1− τkt+1)Fkt+1 + ηit+1
P˜Kt+1 ≡ (1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk − δ −Rft )
M˜C = Ψ1Et[mit+1]Et[
PHt+1
∂τwt+1
] + Ψ1Et[PHt+1]Et[
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
]+
Ψ2Et[Pkt+1]Et[
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
]− Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τwt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W˜τwt
, M˜B ≡ βEt[λt+1]Et[∂M3t+1
∂τwt+1
]
Or more compactly we re-write the previous equation as:
12In the absence of any Heterogeneity, the term fiscal hedging does not lose its meaning however
the self-insurance term in that case can be thought as the indirect effects of taxes on the accumulation
of physical assets. In that respect, the assumption of heterogeneous agents facing idiosyncratic risk is
critical for the interpretation given in our analysis.
13Alternatively, the multipliers can be interpreted in a more conventional “Lagrangian” fashion to
reflect the marginal costs of relaxing the respective constraints. But by being static, the interpretation
given in the text facilitates the intuition of the model better.
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FHh = SLh + M˜C - M˜B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Planner’s Term
(2.55)
The fiscal hedging term, in the example above, reflect the insurance that taxes
provide for the planner against aggregate risk. Everything else being equal, when looking
at the term ∂M3t+1∂τwt+1
, higher taxes increase the revenues in proportion to the tax base
(here Fht+1θ
h
t+1) and the need for funds tends to decrease. In the same time, higher
taxes weakens the desire to accumulate assets, but is delimited by the negative effect on
the (average) growth rate that the increase in taxes will bring.
The self-insurance term is related to the portfolio rebalancing decision discussed
before and is determined by the respective covariances shown in (2.55). In the particular
example, the amount of self-insurance will depend on the covariance of the human
capital returns with the stochastic discount factor, and the covariances of the relevant
risk-premiums with the new pricing kernel. The strength of the latter covariance terms
constitute an effective “Self-insurance benefit”. For example, a higher tax in the most
risky asset allows the planner to gain a greater flexibility in supplying more of the less
risky assets. Under the CRS production function, higher physical capital decreases the
returns of this asset and increases the wages (returns) of human capital. This reallocation
of the factors of production it effectively achieves an insurance benefit. This point is
very crucial. In the competitive equilibrium without government physical capital was
over-accumulated, but as Gottardi et al. (2014a) emphasize, and contrary to the general
belief, over-accumulation of a physical asset does not justify a positive tax.
Therefore, the portfolio rebalancing decisions are pushed toward allocations in
physical capital or public debt. In either case, consumers can earn more insurance. Both
insurance items, either the fiscal hedging or the self-insurance one, are weighted differ-
ently with β, Ψ1 and Ψ2 being the respective weights. Finally, notice the appearance
of the “Planner’s term”. This item has a very specific interpretation, if for example is
positive, it implies that in order to retain the same amount of fiscal hedging the planner
has to resort into higher (tax) distortions. Using (2.45)-(2.46) and manipulating the
previous FOC, we can get a formula for the optimal taxation of Human Capital:
Optimal Human Capital Tax:
τwt+1 =
Portfolio Allocation Term︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1
Et[
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
]

 (FHh − SLh) +
(
M˜B + W˜τwt
)
Ψ1(H + 1) + Ψ2
(
Cov(m∗it+1,P˜kt+1)
Cov(m∗it+1,P˜Ht+1)
)
+ (2.56)
cov(m∗it+1, FHt+1) + cov(m
∗
it+1, (1− τkt+1)FHt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance due to Prices
+ cov(m∗it+1, ηit+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance Due to Idiosyncratic Risk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Planner’s Insurance
(2.57)
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The formula above summarizes all the elements that are affecting the decisions
to tax. It consists of two main terms, a portfolio allocation term and an insurance item,
labelled “Planner’s Insurance”. Looking at the first term, the planner will affect the
portfolios decisions of each agents depending on two factors: a) the strength between
the fiscal hedging needs and the demand for insurance net of the dead-weight costs, b) on
the productivities of each asset. In the formula the term ˜Ht+1 ≡
(
Et[
∂mit+1
∂τwt+1
]/Et[
∂PHt+1
∂τwt+1
]
)
×
Et[PHt+1]
Et[mit+1]
captures the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the risk premium between
the physical assets.
Looking at the second term, the theoretical formula reveals the net insurance
that can be obtained by manipulating this instrument. In particular, the “Planner’s
insurance” term it consists of two main items. An item of insurance that can be obtained
by the change in prices and a “pure” insurance item due to missing markets. If there was
no aggregate uncertainty, the first covariance items would have being zero. Therefore,
each tax instrument it also offers an insurance against fluctuating prices. This point
would be crucial for the interpretation of the main results.
In the exposition above we focused only on one tax instrument. A similar intu-
ition and manipulation of the FOC it also applies for τkt+1. However, in contrast to the
previous case taxing physical capital it creates a form of distortion. More specifically,
an increase in the tax rate of physical capital amounts to rebalance the portfolio alloca-
tions in a way that pushes towards the more risky asset (i.e. human capital), unless the
consumer is not compensated with a sufficient after tax risk-premium in holding this
asset, the amount of insurance might be inefficiently low.
Optimal Capital taxation: Suppose that assets shares and the risk-free rate
obtain their optimal values and the tax on human capital is determined by equation
(2.57). Manipulating constraint (2.45), the optimal tax on physical capital is:
τkt+1 =
[
1− Et[m
∗
it+1ηit+1]
Et[m∗it+1Fkt+1 ]
]
+
Et[m
∗
it+1Fht+1 ]
Et[m∗it+1Fkt+1 ]
(1− τwt+1) (2.58)
As in the case of human capital tax, the optimal tax rate on other physical
asset is in general ambiguous. From the above formula however, what is noteworthy
is that the correlation between the tax rates can be of either sign. Moreover, under
our distributional assumptions for idiosyncratic risk, it implies that Et[m
∗
it+1ηit+1] =
Cov(m∗it+1, ηit+1). Then we can see that the partial effect of the insurance item due
to idiosyncratic risk goes in the opposite direction relative to the human capital tax
formula.
Finally, the planner beside the two fiscal instruments can also manipulate the
risk-free rate. The FOC is very similar and can be found in Appendix 2.8.3. The only
difference is that, away from the borrowing constraints, the manipulation of the rate
of interest affects more directly the sources of public revenues (or interest expenses) as
well as the price of aggregate risk. Moving to the optimal allocations of asset shares,
the FOC with respect to the asset share of human capital is:
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Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂θht+1
]
= Λ + Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θht+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θht+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term I
−βEt
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂θht+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term II︸ ︷︷ ︸
Planner’s term
(2.59)
The planner, in contrast to the agents, internalizes the effects of the “uncoor-
dinated” actions of the consumers to factor prices, that is the “pecuniary externality”.
Absent of any government intervention, uninsured idiosyncratic risk leads to an over-
accumulation of physical-to-human capital ratio which in equilibrium implies that the
returns of investments are inefficiently lower relative to the first best14.
It is instructive here, to clarify that when the ratio of physical-to-human capi-
tal is high relative to the complete market case, does not necessary justify a positive
tax on physical capital, which might correct this over-accumulation. This point was
originally made and formally proved in Gottardi et al. (2014a). The logic, that the
over-accumulation of physical capital should be corrected, is based on an unwarranted
comparison between different types of equilibria: the one in which markets are complete
and in which the markets are incomplete. Using, Gottardi et al. (2014a) words
...the comparison between the level of capital accumulation with and
without complete markets has no clear welfare implication. If there were a
policy tool which could allow to attain the complete market allocation, there
would be little doubt for the policy maker to adopt such a policy as far as
attaining efficiency is concerned. Since a tax and subsidy scheme of the kind
mentioned will not complete the markets, the aforementioned comparison
tells little about the effectiveness of taxation, not to mention whether or not
capital should be taxed. To properly assess whether or not positive taxes
on capital are welfare improving when markets are incomplete, one should
rather compare the competitive equilibria with and without taxes, keeping
the other parts of the market structure, and in particular the set of available
financial assets, fixed.
Indeed, as the same authors prove whether a planner corrects or not this over-
accumulation - which is equivalent to the case whether physical capital should be taxed
or not - it depends on the type of the shocks, and on the degree of heterogeneity of
consumers.
Accordingly, in our case whether the optimal allocation of risk will feature higher
or lower physical to human capital ratio will depend on the two types of risks - the ag-
gregate and the idiosyncratic, both uninsurable. This is because, the insurance and
14In the competitive equilibrium without government the ratio of physical to human capital is higher
relative to complete markets, which in turn implies that there is over-accumulation in physical capital.
See Krebs (2003a,b), Gottardi et al. (2014a) or Toda (2014a) for the formal argument.
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redistribution effects that were analysed in Gottardi et al. (2014a) manifest in our ap-
plication to the fiscal hedging and self-insurance terms. These two motives that the
planner tries to balance, are the decisive elements to characterize whether a welfare
improvement is attained when there is over or under accumulation of physical-to-human
capital ratio, when one keeps the same market structure fixed - that is, the instruments
to complete the markets are missing15.
Next, a similar equation with the respective interpretation holds for the invest-
ment in human capital. Finally, combining the FOCs for φt+1 and θ
k
t+1 to eliminate the
multiplier Λ we can get the Euler equation for the planner. This is:
Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θkt+1
− ∂M1
∂φt+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θkt+1
− ∂M2
∂φt+1
]
+ Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂φt+1
− ∂M3
∂θkt+1
)]
= λtβRxt + (ξU − ξL)Rft︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if constraint does not bind
(2.60)
The optimal holding of the safe asset is determined by the equality between the
marginal value of a unit increase in the supply of this bond this period and the effects
that this change will bring on the reallocation of assets and on the revenues in the
future. The former effect is absent in the competitive economy and it evidences the
direct impact that the planner has on market prices. Pertaining to the latter effect,
the budget constraint in the future will be affected in two ways: a) because the tax
base will change and b) because the public finance discounting, that is the growth rate,
will be affected. Implicit in the above equation is the precautionary savings motive for
the planner adjusted for growth. The borrowing constraints in principle increase that
motive, however the manipulation of the interest rate allows the planner to relax or
make them more stringent. Next paragraphs introduce our main findings.
2.5 Results
To get the values for some of the parameters of the model, we assume that the planner
takes those as given from the competitive economy. The main interest is to recover
the values for the discount factor and the variance for idiosyncratic shocks. Although,
the former parameter value except for some scaling effects on growth, it plays little
role. We get those parameters by imposing certainty equivalence in the competitive
economy. Due to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, the certainty equivalent should be
understood only for the aggregate state. Following the approach in Krebs (2003b) the
values obtained for the discount factor and idiosyncratic uncertainty are β = 0.9458 and
ση = 0.5384 respectively
16. The calibration strategy is discussed in detail in Appendix
15Other notable examples where under-accumulation of physical capital is welfare improving is An-
geletos (2007), Reis and Panousi (2012) and Gottardi et al. (2014c,a)
16In practice, this number for the idiosyncratic volatility turn out to be quite high to obtain conver-
gence. We therefore rescale it by the factor of 100.
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2.8.5.
We also let ρA = ρg = 0.95 and approximated the volatility of government
spending per wealth with that of per output found in the data (i.e log(Gt/Yt)). The
upper bound was set to a number greater than 1 in order not to rule out short positions
in physical assets. The numerical solution was insensitive to that bound but extremely
sensitive to the lower one. The criterion to handle this issue was to choose a number
sufficient to obtain convergence and in parallel be stringent enough to restrict the planner
from financing all of his expenses by accumulating assets17. Table 2.1 summarizes main
parameters.
β α δ A¯ ρA B
0.9458 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.95 1.2/β
g¯ B σg ση σA
0.04 -0.50/β 0.09 0.0054 0.01
Table 2.1: Benchmark Calibration
Before discussing the main results, a few more remarks are in order. In the rep-
resentative agent literature, as for instance in Angeletos (2002) or Buera and Nicolini
(2004) the government can complete the markets by trading its own assets. This however
requires the number of assets to be equal to the number of states. In Farhi (2010) and in
our case although the government is trading assets that option is not available and mar-
kets cannot be completed in the usual sense. Nevertheless between us and Farhi (2010)
some subtle differences still exist. First, agents in our framework are heterogeneous
second the government instead of managing its own liabilities trades, or dictates if you
prefer, the investment decisions of the consumers. In this respect there are some crucial
differences in the interpretation. Previously, we showed that the economy is equivalent
to a single agent facing two types of uninsurable risks. The planner replaces that agent
and trades assets to offer the necessary insurance against the effective uncertainty,
that of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, the preferred interpretation here is
that the planner tries to maintain the insurance mechanism that factor prices offer to
the agents18.
θk θh φ τk τw Rf
Means 0.57% 0.89% -0.46% -5.82% 7.81% 1.13%
Volatility 0.42% 0.69 % 0.27% 1.77% 0.17 % 0.67%
Note: The statistics reflect sample moments from a 10,000 random draws where the
first 10% disregarded.
Table 2.2: Properties of the Model
17We solved the model based on PEA. It is well known that the stability properties of such numerical
method are extremely poor. To overcome this difficulty we borrowed some of the techniques in Judd
et al. (2011). Nevertheless, the uncertainty parameter of the idiosyncratic shocks and the lower bound
of the borrowing constraints, turned out to be extremely sensitive parameters for achieving convergence.
A detailed description of the algorithm can be found in Appendix 2.8.4. In the future we hope to
accommodate this issue much more robustly.
18For the insurance role of prices under incomplete markets see Da´vila et al. (2012), Carvajal and
Polemarchakis (2011), Gottardi et al. (2014a) among others
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Turning on the analysis of the results, from Proposition 1 and the discussion
therein, the (approximate) random walk hypothesis of labour income and the approx-
imate risk-neutrality of the agents, jointly determine that government bonds are in-
effective means for consumption smoothing, hence welfare is maximized whenever an
efficient path for growth is chosen. Table 2.2 shows how this is achieved. The plan-
ner takes short positions in bonds in order to accumulate sufficient income while the
stabilization of public finances mainly occurs through the manipulation of the interest
rate. In addition, by taking short positions in debt and long in the other assets he
balances between insurance and investment productivities. In particular, he takes (as
expected) the largest position in human capital. Debt provides (self-)insurance against
the macroeconomic shocks, thus by accumulating assets the planner is able to earn in-
terest and secure a source of revenue. In consequence the safe asset is the least traded
among all assets. Similarly physical capital it is optimally less traded than human cap-
ital. From the same table, the planner chose to intervene across states by manipulating
the tax subsidies in physical capital (See Appendix 2.8.6 ), while labour (in efficiency
units) taxes are kept relatively smooth. This result extends the standard labour tax
smoothing to the broader category of effective labour.
Referring to the signs of the tax instruments, their justification follow the dis-
cussion in earlier sections. More specifically, a subsidy in physical capital increases the
supply of this asset and depresses its price, this however helps the returns on human
capital to increase. That is the insurance policy here is to protect the returns of the
most risky asset. However, in order to discourage an excessive risk taking and thus an
inefficiently low amount of returns, the planner will also like to impose a positive tax on
that asset. This argument is in line with the first principles of public finances where wel-
fare can be improved if risky sources of income are insured and encourage investments in
less productive assets. Gottardi et al. (2014a) where the first to formalize this argument
in a similar context and showed how the optimal tax on physical capital depends on
the type of risk. In our case these two different types of risks are the aggregate and
idiosyncratic.
In Table 2.3 we see the effects of the idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio rebalancing
and the design of policies. The table shows the percentage changes relative to the
benchmark values in Table 2.2. Higher idiosyncratic uncertainty has two important
effects, first it dramatically increases the price of aggregate risk and secondly it rises the
insurance (risk-premium) for the most risky asset. Relative to the benchmark case, the
total effect is a decline in the growth rate and welfare. But how the planner would like
to balance between the higher price of fiscal hedging and the demand for insurance by
the individuals ? Or how precautionary savings against the effective uncertainty will be
accommodated ?
From the results in Table 2.3 the planner will increase the tax on labour, cut the
subsidies and will take longer positions in the two capital goods. The latter composition
is assisted by making borrowing more cheap through the decline in the rate of interest.
This allows to counter-balance the increase in tax and the cut in subsidies. However,
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to protect the returns in the most risky asset notice that quantitatively the increase in
the share of the physical capital is larger from the increase in human even if the cut in
subsidies is stronger.
Notice, that from this comparative static exercise we can see that the price of
aggregate risk increases a lot more than the insurance for human capital. This might
be indicative that the overall fiscal hedging dominates the demand for self-insurance by
the individuals and accumulating more assets by the government is optimal.
Porfolio Allocations θk θh φ
0.087% 0.056% 0.0195 %
Policies τk τw Rf
% Changes -2.86% 1.84% -0.0177%
Growth -0.093%
Welfare loss 0.0024%
Human Capital Premium 0.011 %
Risk Premium 27.84 %
Note: The numbers denote percentage changes from the Benchmark values.
The new value for the variance of idiosyncratic risk changed to ση = 0.010
from ση = 0.0058. As in Gottardi et al. (2014b) we define the Human capital
Premium Fh −Fk and the Risk Premium the difference between the market
returns and the risk-free rate, E[Rxit ]−Rf
Table 2.3: Higher Idiosyncratic Risk
Finally, to show how the composition of investments in the portfolios of the agents
affects economic growth and by implication welfare, we use a crude approximation of the
US tax system taken from Chari et al. (1994)19. The average tax rates for both assets
are positive in this economy. In Table 2.4 we have solved recursively the objective of the
planner (i.e equation (2.19)) for two different economies. It is clear from Table 2.4 that
the competitive economy produces an excessive risk taking and by implication welfare
will be lower. Reallocating the factors of production in the way previously described and
increasing the interest rate to off-set an inefficiently higher level of borrowing constitutes
a welfare improvement.
θk θh φ Rf Growth Rate Welfare
Optimal Plan 0.57% 0.89% -0.46% 1.13 7.91 % -1.52
US Economy 0.52% 0.96% -0.49% 1.09 2.97 % -2.41
Table 2.4: Comparison with US policies
Putting altogether, the main intuition of the results can be expressed as follows.
Begging with the properties explained in proposition (2), idiosyncratic risk although
quantitatively important overall the assumption of uninsurable aggregate risk seems to
dominate. Under our proposition where idiosyncratic risk is permanent event, public
debt as a safe asset has little bearing for individual self-insurance. For example, a
19The time path or the fiscal rules for taxes that these authors estimated are τkt % = 27.1− 0.71At +
0.52Gt
Yt
and τwt % = 23.8 − 0.027At + 0.11GtYt respectively. For convenience we assumed that taxes on
labour are equivalent to those on effective labour.
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shock such as one’s leg is cut which changes his level of human capital and his income
permanently, by running the buffer of savings down - accumulated through the safe asset
- does little to cure the subsequent drop in his consumption. In this case, it is optimal
not to issue debt, which would have implied much larger taxes - especially on labour
- but rather accumulate assets. When this is the case, then the government has the
option to finance part of its expenses by accruing interest and therefore set lower taxes.
Note that this logic is similar to the one found in standard models, such as in
Aiyagari et al. (2002). Nevertheless, idiosyncratic uncertainty allows the potential twist
of the result - which is a possibility that the standard models do not offer20.
On the other hand, fluctuating prices - due to business cycles or aggregate un-
certainty more generally - affect both, the level of government revenues as well as the
income of the consumers. The planner, knowing that human capital is not only the
most productive asset but it also consist the largest tax base, setting a positive though
smooth tax rate, on the one hand can accumulate a sufficient amount of revenues and
on the other reduce the variability of returns for this asset - which is a form of insur-
ance against the effective uncertainty. To encourage however investment in other assets,
the incentive that it provides is a tax subsidy. This policy, not only sets the “right”
investment composition to maximize growth - which is the objective of planner in order
to maximize welfare - but also prevents consumers to invest too much in human capital
that would potentially diminish their returns due the subsequent over-supply. It is then
possible, for the planner to stabilize public finances across different cycle periods by
manipulating mostly the interest rate and the tax subsidy. The next section, provides
an example of such policies over the cycle.
2.6 Managing A Stock Market Crash
Figure 2.1 below shows the response of the planner to a “Stock Market Crash” which
in our case is equivalent to a negative TFP shock. The collapse in the stock market it
implies that the growth rate, welfare and public revenues will all fall. From the previous
discussion the objective of the planner is to set an efficient path for growth and stabilize
the public finances. To do so, the planner will announce a tax hike for human capital and
reduce the subsidies in physical capital. In the same time the planner will inject more
liquidity to the economic system and facilitate borrowing by reducing the interest rate.
The combination of these policies allow individuals to borrow more in the short-run and
rebalance their portfolios towards the most productive asset. In other words, the spur in
growth it comes from a decisive long-position in human capital financed through short
positions in debt and short-selling physical capital.
Nevertheless there are some noteworthy subtleties. Allowing for a reduction
in the rate of interest endangers the private sector to accumulate inefficient levels of
leverage. To prevent this route, the planner after some time will gradually increase the
borrowing costs and the subsidies in physical capital in a way that offset the steady
20We believe if preferences are other than logarithmic, and therefore agents might have a plausible
risk aversion, idiosyncratic risk might play greater role. We aim to address this case in the near future.
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A negative 1% productivity shock. The impulses are percentage deviations from the values in Table 2.2
Figure 2.1: Stock Market Crash
decline in labour taxes. Therefore, the share in human capital will start gradually to
fall and increase that in physical capital until the new balanced growth path is reached.
Under this policy it is evident that growth is restored mainly through the productivity
(effective returns) of human capital.
Finally, once the effects of the shock cease the economy enters a new growth path
where the interest rates, the share in physical capital and the assets for the government
are higher relative to the “pre-crisis” levels, while the share in human capital will be
permanently lower. This is again consistent with our previous analysis, where from the
short-run to the medium or long-run (i.e transition to the new balanced growth path)
the after tax returns on human capital (i.e the most risky-asset) are again protected.
Figure 2.2: Time Paths for Risk-free Rate and Welfare
The previous paragraph conveyed a unique message over the optimal management
of the economy. Simply put, when growth is endogenously determined and there exist
different investment opportunities, the Key to optimal policy is: let first the economy
take excessive risks, discharge it later and protect its returns over-time. To highlight
that particular philosophy, we contrast the management of the stock market crash by
the planner against the same “US fiscal rules” that we used for the results in Table 2.4.
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The two figures below depict the time paths for the main variables of interest. Figure 2.2
displays the responses and the subsequent time path of for the interest rates (risk-free
rate) and the welfare loss that occurs in each economy after the “stock market crash”.
Equivalently, Figure 2.3 depicts the portfolio allocations. First, in the competi-
tive economy the response to shock is accommodated with an inefficiently lower interest
rate which results to an excessive borrowing. The investment strategy then of the “US
economy” is to take larger than the optimal short positions in bonds and inefficiently
lower long position in human capital. Relative to the optimal policy the competitive
economy mis-allocates physical capital, in the sense that instead of selling stocks of
physical capital the agent in the competitive economy inefficiently buys more stocks of
that asset. Looking at Figure 2.3, in the new balanced growth path the level of shares in
the portfolios of the agents will be higher than the pre-crisis levels, but its composition
is inefficiently structured. In line with the earlier exposition, the inefficient portfolio
composition amounts to improperly specified equilibrium (after tax) price levels. In
consequence, the latter effect will not only amount to a permanent lower (relative to
the pre-crisis level) welfare but also a steady increase of the welfare gap between the
competitive and centralized economy, as we can see from Figure2.2 in the right panel.
Figure 2.3: Portfolio Allocations: Planner vs US
2.7 Conclusions
To sum up, recessions are periods where people are frequently pursuing a human capital
investment as for example through additional education. To some approximation anyone
that invests in his education it essentially opts for a particular return. Macroeconomic
policies rarely took that event into a serious consideration, although is crucial element
for the short run and the determination of growth in the future. Even after the financial
crisis and the frequent public debate about stagnated growth was rarely discussed let
alone linked to the optimal government financing. Our paper addressed this concern
and raised this issue implicitly.
The very large portfolio share that this asset has in the real world and the fact
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that is subject to idiosyncratic risk is not yet understood how it might affect the design of
policies and by implication public finances. In principle, the presence of idiosyncratic risk
to that asset is no different than other models of precautionary savings. However what
is omitted is its productivity and the contribution to growth. Therefore an important
element for the macroeconomic management in the short-run is silenced.
In a summary of our results, we essentially showed that what private equity might
be for the monetary quantitative easing, human capital might be for fiscal policy. As a
type of asset that is subject to idiosyncratic risk, in the short-run, can be a resources
that fiscal policy can empower in order to efficiently promote growth. Nevertheless, this
argument is strictly conditioned in the case where markets are incomplete both at the
aggregate and the individual level.
Finally, our analysis was limited in the special case of the logarithmic utility. This
had the advantage of being analytically tractable. Nevertheless, in this case we missed
all the interesting interaction between asset prices and the marginal value of wealth.
Effectively, this is equivalent to ignore the role of consumption smoothing. Secondly,
we restricted ourselves to optimal policies with imperfect institution commitment and
to the case where idiosyncratic risk does not covary along the cycle. All the above
we conceive them as important limitations and therefore extending the model in this
direction is promising.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Agents Problem
To get the results for lemma 2 we use a guess and verify procedure based on the semi-
closed solution offered by Toda (2014b) for these class of models. Notice that our
distributional assumptions on aggregate and idiosyncratic risk satisfy his assumptions.
The maximization problem is:
V (xit) = max
cit,φt+1,θkt+1,θ
h
t+1
[
exp
(
(1− β) log cit + βEt log
[
V (xit+1)
])]
(2.61)
s.t
xit+1 = Rxit+1(xit − cit) (2.62)
φt+1+θ
k
t+1 + θ
h
t+1 = 1 (2.63)
The FOC for consumption will satisfy:
(1− β)c−1it = βEt
[
V −1(xit+1)
∂V (xit+1)
∂xit+1
Rxit+1
]
(2.64)
Guessing V (xit) = νtxit, defining ut =
cit
xit
and substituting the budget constraint
(2.62) in equation (2.64), gives cit = (1−β)xit (with ut ≡ 1−β) which is equation (2.20)
in the lemma.
The FOCs for the portfolio shares give the standard arbitrage conditions:
Et
[
R−1xit+1R
k
t+1
]
= Et
[
R−1xit+1R
i
t+1
]
(2.65)
Et
[
R−1xit+1R
k
t+1
]
= Et
[
R−1xit+1
]
Rft (2.66)
These arbitrage conditions are the analogue of the Euler equations (2.10)-(2.12)
once (2.20) and (2.62) are substituted in and deliver equations (2.26)-(2.28) in the
lemma. Using the guess for the value function, the budget constraint and taking loga-
rithms in the bellman equation, gives
log νt = κ+ βEt[log νt+1] + βEt[logRxit+1 ] (2.67)
which is equation (2.19) in the main text and κ is an unimportant constant equal
to κ = (1− β) log(1− β) + β log β. It is straight forward to confirm that our guesses for
the value function and the consumption rule satisfy the bellman equation. Finally, the
rest of the equations in the lemma follow directly from the definitions in (2.13)-(2.16).
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2.8.2 Proof for Tax Indeterminacy
In this part we formalize the discussion of Section 2.4. The proof strictly follows
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Zhu (1992) and extends their economy by adding
an additional capital good (Human Capital) to reflect our own framework. The main
scope is to facilitate the exposition over the restrictions that need to be placed in the
fiscal instruments in order to limit their scope to complete the market on the aggregate.
Since the solution of the model is equivalent to one agent problem facing two
types of shocks, for simplification we drop all individual indexes. In the sequence we
will also omit any formal reference in the description of the idiosyncratic risk. This
is done for brevity and clarity as it is irrelevant for the argument. To begin with, we
define the history of the economy over and up to period t with the vector st and let st to
describe a particular event. We also let Π(st) to be the probability of a particular history.
We assume the unfolding of history has a first order Markov structure, therefore the
conditional probability of the next period event given the current state is Πt+1(s
t+1|st) =
Πt+1(st+1)
Πt(st)
. Conditional expectations are defined over this measure. One remark is in
order, with idiosyncratic risk the measure over conditional expectations have to take
into account the idiosyncratic event. However since this measure must be the same for
all individuals and the risk-free rate is common, the thrust of our exposition here does
not change. The assumptions of the model, as for instance stated in Krebs (2006), over
the conditional probability is Πt+1(s
t+1, sit+1|st) where sit+1 is the idiosyncratic state.
Finally, we let rt be the returns from physical capital and wt the returns on human
capital, and ignore the depreciation rate in both.
The exposition proceeds in two steps. In the first, we assume that the aggre-
gate state can be insured. That is we assume the existence of Arrow securities (i.e
state-contingent bonds) and show that state contingent taxes when public debt is state
contingent result to indeterminacy. In the second step we show how the complete mar-
ket outcome can be attained by restricting some of the instruments. Doing so, becomes
immediate that for the incomplete markets outcome it is necessary all of the instruments
to be restricted.
Complete Markets
Let bt+1(st+1|st) be the government debt at the beginning in period t+ 1 if the
event st+1 occurs, and let pt(st+1|st) its Arrow price. The first order conditions and
budget constraints are:
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ct(s
t) + kt+1(s
t) + ht+1(s
t) +
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) = (2.68)
bt(st|st−1)+(1− τkt (st))rt(st)kt(st−1) + (1− τwt (st))wt(st)ht(st−1)
pt(st+1|st) = βΠt+1(st+1|st)
Uct+1
Uct
⇒
∑
st+1|st
pt(st+1|st) = Et[β
Uct+1
Uct
] (2.69)
Uct = βEt
[
Uct+1(1− τkt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1)
]
(2.70)
Uct = βEt
[
Uct+1(1− τwt+1(st+1))wt+1(st+1)
]
(2.71)
G(st) = τkt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t−1) + τwt (s
t)wt(s
t)ht(s
t−1)
+
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st)− bt(st|st−1) (2.72)
where Uct is the marginal utility of consumption in period t. Obviously the
logarithmic utility function that we used in the main text is a special case. Let {kt (st)}
and {wt (st)} be two random processes with the following two properties:
Et[Uct+1
k
t+1rt+1(s
t+1)] = 0 (2.73)
Et[Uct+1
w
t+1wt+1(s
t+1)] = 0 (2.74)
Consider the following alternative policies which are also feasible:
τˆkt+1 = τ
k
t+1 + 
k
t+1(s
t+1) (2.75)
τˆwt+1 = τ
w
t+1 + 
w
t+1(s
t+1) (2.76)
bˆ(st+1|st) = b(st+1|st) + kt+1(st+1)rt+1(st+1)kt+1(st) (2.77)
+ wt+1(s
t+1)wt+1(s
t)ht+1(s
t) (2.78)
and the plans:
Uct = βEt
[
Uct+1(1− τˆkt+1)rt+1(st+1)
]
(2.79)
Uct = βEt
[
Uct+1(1− τˆwt+1)wt+1(st+1)
]
(2.80)
G(st) = τkt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t−1) + τwt (s
t)wt(s
t)ht(s
t−1)+∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bˆ(st+1|st)− bt(st|st−1) (2.81)
Substituting the tax policies in the Euler equations and invoking (2.73) and
(2.74), it leaves the Euler equations in the competitive system unaltered. This in turn
62
implies that the Arrow prices are not affected either. Therefore, substituting the plans
for the alternative bond holding in the budget constraint of the government, the rev-
enues remain the same. Consequently, since there are infinite ways of generating random
variables that satisfy the properties in (2.73) and (2.74) state-contingent taxes will be
indetermined.
Completing the Markets through instruments
Suppose now that we restrict the taxes to be non-state contingent. Choose
numbers τ¯kt+1(s
t) and τ¯wt+1(s
t) such as:
Et
[
Uct+1(1− τkt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1)
]
= Et
[
Uct+1(1− τ¯kt+1(st))rt+1(st+1)
]
(2.82)
Et
[
Uct+1(1− τwt+1(st+1))wt+1(st+1)
]
= Et
[
Uct+1(1− τ¯wt+1(st))wt+1(st+1)
]
(2.83)
which implies:
τ¯kt+1(s
t) =
Et
[
Uct+1(1− τkt+1(st+1))rt+1(st+1)
]
Et
[
Uct+1rt+1(s
t+1)
] (2.84)
τ¯wt+1(s
t) =
Et
[
Uct+1(1− τwt+1(st+1))wt+1(st+1)
]
Et
[
Uct+1wt+1(s
t+1)
] (2.85)
Then invoking (2.75) and (2.76), two particular random sequences consistent
with the complete markets outcome are:
kt+1(s
t+1) = τ¯kt+1(s
t)− τkt+1 (2.86)
wt+1(s
t+1) = τ¯wt+1(s
t)− τwt+1 (2.87)
Therefore we can construct any tax policy based on the previous procedure and be
able to complete the markets. Next, suppose that debt is safe (risk-free) and in addition
assume that the taxes on human capital are known in advance (non-state contingent).
This help us to construct a particular sequence for wt+1(s
t+1) as before. It remains to
show what kind of particular sequence for kt+1(s
t+1) can be constructed in order to
support the complete markets outcome. This can be done as follows:
Suppose that
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)bt+1(st+1|st) =
∑
st+1
pt(st+1|st)b¯t+1(st), substi-
tute in this expression the equilibrium Arrow price, to get:
b¯t+1(s
t) =
EtUct+1bt+1(st+1|st)
EtUct+1
(2.88)
Then by (2.78) the change in taxes needed to support the complete markets
under those restrictions is: kt+1(s
t+1) =
b¯t+1(st)−b(st+1|st)−wt+1(st+1)w(st+1)ht+1(st)
rt+1(st+1)kt+1(st)
. It is
possible to show through similar steps that the complete markets outcome is attainable
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if instead we have assumed that τkt are non-state contingent. In consequence, to restrict
the planner to use any of the fiscal instruments to complete the markets on the aggregate,
it is necessary all of the instruments to be simultaneously restricted.
2.8.3 FOCs and Computational Methodology
The FOCs for the allocations are:
θkt+1: β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂θkt+1
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θkt+1
]
+ ...
−βt+1Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θkt+1
]
+ βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂θkt+1
)]
= βt+1Λ (2.89)
θht+1: β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂θht+1
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θht+1
]
+ ...
−βt+1Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θht+1
]
+ βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂θht+1
)]
= βt+1Λ (2.90)
φt+1: β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂φt+1
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂φt+1
]
+ ...
−βt+1Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂φt+1
]
....
−βt+1λtβRxt + βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂φt+1
)]
= βt+1Λ + βt+1(ξU − ξL)Rft (2.91)
The FOCs for the instruments are:
64
τkt+1: β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τkt+1
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂τkt+1
]
+ ...
−βt+1Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂τkt+1
]
+ βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂τkt+1
)]
= 0 (2.92)
τwt+1: β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τwt+1
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂τwt+1
]
+ ...
−βt+1Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂τwt+1
]
+ βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂τwt+1
)]
= 0 (2.93)
Rft : β
t+1Et
[
∂ logRixt+1
∂Rft
]
− βt+1Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂Rft
]
− βt+1Ψ2βEt
[
∂M2
∂Rft
]
+ ...
+βt+2Et
[
λt+1
(
∂M3t+1
∂Rft
)]
= (ξU − ξL)φt+1 (2.94)
The system of equations can be organized and simplified by eliminating the
multiplier, Λ, as follows:
Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θht+1
− ∂M1
∂θkt+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θht+1
− ∂M2
∂θkt+1
]
= Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂θht+1
− ∂M3
∂θkt+1
)]
(2.95)
Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂θkt+1
− ∂M1
∂φt+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂θkt+1
− ∂M2
∂φt+1
]
− Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂θkt+1
− ∂M3
∂φt+1
)]
− λtβRxt = (ξU − ξL)Rft︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if constraint does not bind
(2.96)
Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τkt+1
− ∂ logRxit+1
∂τwt+1
]
+ Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂τwt+1
− ∂M1
∂τkt+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂τwt+1
− ∂M2
∂τkt+1
]
= Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂τwt+1
− ∂M3
∂τkt+1
)] (2.97)
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Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂Rft+1
− ∂ logRxit+1
∂τkt+1
]
+ Ψ1Et
[
∂M1
∂τkt+1
− ∂M1
∂Rft+1
]
+ Ψ2Et
[
∂M2
∂τkt+1
− ∂M1
∂Rft+1
]
− Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂τkt+1
− ∂M3
∂Rft+1
)]
= (ξU − ξL)φt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if constraint does not bind
(2.98)
In the above system, we combine (2.89) with (2.90) to get (2.95), (2.89) with
(2.91) to get (2.96), (2.92) with (2.93) to get (2.97) and (2.93) with (2.94) to get (2.98).
Solving for this system together with the constraints of the planner determines the
equilibrium of the model. Notice that the multipliers Ψ1 and Ψ2 can be recovered in
multiple ways. Thus the system is non-invertible. That feature imposes a significant
problem in solving for the equilibrium. we next describe the computational methodology
and the algorithm that the solution was based.
2.8.4 Computational Algorithm
Solving for the equilibrium of the Ramsay problem is computationally challenging. First
the relatively large state space and second the nature of some of the state variables
increases the perplexity of the calibration for the grid choices. For example, negative
asset shares on physical assets cannot be ruled out, i.e short sales. To add more to the
complexity, asset shares must always add up to 1 which creates an infinite combination
of grid points that could potentially satisfy this relationship. Similarly, characterizing
a grid for the tax rates adds to the computational challenge since subsidies cannot
be ruled out either. A potential resolution was to adapt the “one period” dynamic
programming suggested in Kydland and Prescott (1980) and as applied in Farhi (2010)
where some of the state variables can be treated as controls. This approach however,
relies on the assumption that the value function (in our case the equivalent will be on the
coefficient νt) is differentiable which is hard to prove in practice due to the non-convex
constraint set and is uncertain whether would be satisfied numerically. Beside this, a
standard dynamic programming could run at a very expensive computational cost given
our relatively large state space.
In the traditional projection methods the state vector is usually fixed relying
on some polynomials to distribute the collocation points, due to the concerns outlined
before, an alternative is to rely on simulation methods. This approach has advantages
and disadvantages. The advantage is that the equilibrium is computed at points of the
ergodic set, that is the part of the state space which is visited in equilibrium. The
disadvantage is the poor numerical stability properties that exhibit. The approach we
choose mixes simulations and projection methods as developed by Judd et al. (2011) or
Maliar and Maliar (2015) and uses their numerical routines. However, the nature of our
problem exhibits characteristics rarely found in the literate and so we discuss elements of
the numerical methodology that we used to solve the model that might be also useful for
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other applications. The philosophy of the algorithm tries to balance between stability,
accuracy and speed.
The equilibrium of the model is found by solving the FOCs in the system (2.95)-
(2.98) together with the constraints of the planner. We repeat the constraints for con-
venience:
Et
[
R−1ixt+1((1− τwt+1)Fh(θkt+1, θht+1) + ηit+1)
]
= Et
[
R−1ixt+1((1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1))
]
(2.99)
Et
[
R−1ixt+1(1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ)
]
= Et
[
R−1ixt+1
]
Rft (2.100)
φt+1 + θ
k
t+1 + θ
h
t+1 = 1 (2.101)
φt+1βRxt = R
f
t−1φt + gt − τkt Fkθkt − τwt FHθht
(2.102)
First notice that if we know the policy functions for the three instruments and
the assets shares we can compute certain expectations. In particular all expectations
that do not involve the Lagrangian λt+1 can be computed using Quadrature. We use a
two node integration for all cases. Define the state vector described in the text as Xt.
The algorithm relies on parametrizing expectations and using them to define relevant
policy functions for the variables of interest. In particular, the algorithm proceeds as
follows
STEP 1: calibrate the model and draw random variables in accordance with the
distributional assumptions about the shocks. We use T=20000 random draws.
STEP 2: parametrize the following expectations
Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂θht+1
− ∂M3
∂θkt+1
)]
≈ Φ1(Xt, b1) (2.103)
Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂τwt+1
− ∂M3
∂τkt+1
)]
≈ Φ2(Xt, b2) (2.104)
Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂θkt+1
− ∂M3
∂φt+1
)]
≈ Φ3(Xt, b3) (2.105)
Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂τkt+1
− ∂M3
∂Rft+1
)]
≈ Φ4(Xt, b4) (2.106)
where Φ(Xt, b) is a linear polynomial in the levels of the state variables and b
the respective polynomial coefficients. In fact, for all approximations we used linear
polynomials.
STEP 3: Form the policy functions below, by parametrizing the following expec-
tations:
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k˜t+1 ≈ K(Xt) ≡
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)k˜t+1
)]
≈ Φ5(Xt, b5)
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τwt+1)(Fh(θkt+1, θht+1) + ηit+1)
)]
≈ Φ6(Xt, b6)
(2.107)
Rft ≈ Rf (Xt) ≡
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ
)]
≈ Φ7(Xt, b7)
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
]
≈ Φ8(Xt, b8)
(2.108)
τkt+1 ≈ T k(Xt) ≡
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)τkt+1
)
Φ3(Xt, b3)
]
≈ Φ9(Xt, b9)
Φ3(Xt, b3)
(2.109)
τwt+1 ≈ T w(Xt) ≡
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τwt+1)(Fh(θkt+1, θht+1) + ηit+1)
)
τwt+1
]
≈ Φ10(Xt, b10)
Et
[
R−1ixt+1
(
(1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)
)]
≈ Φ11(Xt, g11)
(2.110)
STEP 4: Calculate the asset shares.
In this step, calculate the growth rate Et−1 ≡ Rxt analytically and use equation
(2.102) to get φt+1. Check whether the constraint binds or not and assign the relevant
value. From this point and until step 7, the algorithm is split between cases about the
binding constraint.
 From the financial market clearing condition, that is equation (2.101), write it as:
φt+1 + (
θkt+1
θht+1︸︷︷︸
k˜t+1
+1)θht+1 = 1 and solve for the share of human capital, θ
h
t+1. Recover
then the share of physical capital as, θkt+1 = k˜t+1θ
h
t+1
STEP 5 Given the steps in 2 and 3, and having computed the asset shares we
can compute the remaining expectations that do not involve the future value of the
Lagrangian λt+1. We did this using Quadrature with two nodes for each shocks.
STEP 6: Given step 5 use the FOCs, (2.95) and (2.97), to recover the values for
Ψ1 and Ψ2 by solving the linear system of equations with respect to these two variables.
Step 7: Given steps 5 and 6 recover λt by combining the other two FOCs, that
is equations (2.96) and (2.98). Notice, that if the constraints bind, these two equations
can still be combined by eliminating the Lagrangian (either ξU or ξL) and so do not
have to be stored.
STEP 8: Given the series of the variables obtained in the previous steps, calculate
the realized expectations in the tradition of PEA and update coefficients through a linear
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regression. In the regression method we used regularization techniques described in Judd
et al. (2011) and in particular the RLS-Tikhonov with normalized data and penalty -7.
The regressions are run by the routines provided by those authors.
We will shortly discuss the formulation and justification of the policy functions
formed in step 3. In forming the policy function for k˜t, τ
w
t+1 or R
f
t+1 we utilized the
predetermined nature of these variables ( i.e. all are t measurable) and reformulated
the constraints (2.99) and (2.100) in the way shown. This is a standard artifice either
to break the non-singularity of portfolio choice problems (See for instance Marcet and
Lorenzoni (1998)) or to perform a derivative-free fixed point iteration (See for example
Maliar and Maliar (2015), or Judd et al. (2014)). We could have applied the same
approach and reformulate the FOC’s of the planner in order to back up some of the same
variables. However in practice the process failed to convergence. Thus I used a simple
idea. Since constraint (2.45) must also hold and is a reformulation of the portfolio (Euler)
conditions, we used the already parametrized expectation Et
[
βλt+1
(
∂M3
∂θkt+1
− ∂M3∂φt+1
)]
≈
Φ3(Xt, b3) that shows up in the Euler equation for planner (i.e (2.96)) and together with
the predetermined nature of τkt+1 we reformulated constraint (2.45) in accordance with
(2.109). Nothing in the properties of the equilibrium changed if the same approach
would have being used for any other candidate variable. The criterion for performing
this strategy to construct the policy function for τkt+1 was solely for computational
convenience, since with the initializations on the coefficient, the speed of convergence was
faster. A similar idea, although not identical, is the “Forward State PAE” modification
proposed by Faraglia et al. (2014b), where future values inside the expectations are
treated as policy functions and by the law of iterated expectation it is possible to break
the non-singularity of the system.
Practical Issues: The guess about the initial conditions for the polynomial coefficients,
in our context, was hard to find. Traditional methods suggested in the literature (den
Haan and Marcet (1990), Marcet and Lorenzoni (1998)) did not work. The strategy
we developed then was, to first solve the model assuming a state space that jointly
encompasses some of the state variables and initialized the polynomial coefficients by
some arbitrary guesses. That is we reduced the state space through some educated
procedure. For example, in this model the asset shares, taxes and the TFP shock all
are entering the average gross portfolio returns and define a particular function that
its value is guaranteed to be different from zero, i.e Et[Rxit ] ≡ R¯xt = Rft−1φt + (1 +
(1 − τk)AtFht − δ)θht + (1 + (1 − τk)AtFkt − δ)θkt . Hence we started with the reduced
space [R¯xt , gt], and with the help of moving bounds (see Maliar and Maliar (2003)) the
algorithm in most of the cases was converging. However this was possible only when we
used the regression routines provided by Judd et al. (2011). After obtaining convergence,
we used the solution for the polynomial coefficients as initial guesses and add each time
autonomously a state variable dictated by the model until we reach the original state
space. The dumping parameter was set to 0.2. Moreover, the algorithm turned out
to be quite sensitive to the variance of idiosyncratic shocks, σ2η. In that case we were
loosening the convergence criteria and set the dumping parameter to a lower value.
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2.8.5 Competitive Equilibrium: Steady State
In this section we describe in some detail the calibration process used to get the results.
Notice that due to endogenous growth the economy is non-stationary. We thus convert
the model in stationary form, by dividing each variable with the returns inclusive wealth,
Xt. In this case the economy is on its balanced growth path. Second, in the macro-
economic state debt and capital are collinear assets. By a standard arbitrage argument
their returns must be equal, so we also set Rf = Rk where we also normalized the price
of bonds to one. We re-define the asset shares as θht =
Ht
St
and 1− θht = Kt+BtSt . Finally,
we omit any borrowing constraints. The system of equations to be solved is:
Aggregate Portfolio returns : Rx = R
k(1− θh) + θhRh (2.111)
Growth rate : 1 + gr = Rxβ (2.112)
Consumption : c˜ = (1− β) (2.113)
Human Capital : h˜ = βθh (2.114)
Physical Capital : k˜ = β(1− θh)− b˜ (2.115)
Governemnt debt : b˜ =
g¯ − τkrk˜ − τwwh˜
1 + gr −Rk (2.116)
FOC for θh : E
[
Rk −Ri
Rix
]
= 0 (2.117)
Distribution of idiosyncratic shocks : ηit ∼ iid N(0, σ2η) (2.118)
Microeconomic state : hiit = βRxithit−1 (2.119)
To keep things simple, the distributional assumptions about the idiosyncratic
shock allows to manipulate the FOC for the optimal share in a way that we can use the
following approximation:
θh ≈ r˜h − r˜k
σ2
(2.120)
The steady state then becomes a non-linear system of equations to be solved for.
The calibration process then is similar to Krebs (2003b) and Gottardi et al. (2014b)
which we described in the main text. We next show how to arrive to the previous
approximation and get the value for the parameter σ2η.
In the balanced growth path, the market clearing condition for the share of
human capital comes from the respective FOC. This is:
E[R−1xit+1η
i
t+1] = (r˜k − r˜h)E[R−1xit+1 ] (2.121)
where r˜k = (1 − τk)fk, r˜h = (1 − τw)fh are the after tax returns of physical
and human capital. To find the previous approximation we utilize the Gaussian for-
mula. More specifically notice that the gross portfolio returns can be also be written as,
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exp(log(Rx−1i )) = exp(− log(R)) ≈ exp[−(r˜k(1 − θh) + r˜ihθh)]. The stochastic part, is
equal to exp[−(ηit+1θh)]. Manipulating (2.121), someone can get the following equation:
E[exp[−(ηit+1θh)]ηit+1] = (r˜k − r˜h)E[exp[−(ηit+1θh)]] (2.122)
E[
(
exp[−(σθhZ)]
)
σZ] = (r˜k − r˜h)E[exp[−(ηit+1θh)]] (2.123)
E[
(
exp[−(σθhZ)]
)
Z] =
(r˜k − r˜h)
σ
E[exp[−(ηit+1θh)]] (2.124)
Where Z is the standard normal, then by the Gaussian formula (i.e −σθh =
(r˜k−r˜h)
σ ) the above equation implies:
θh =
r˜h(k˜)− r˜k(k˜)
σ2
(2.125)
Using the definition of θh ≡ ( 1
1+k˜+b˜
) we can solve the non-linear equations in
(2.121) by replacing the FOC for the human capital share with the closed form counter-
part derived before. The subsequent steps show how to get the number for the idiosyn-
cratic volatility.
More specifically, the individual law of motion for the human capital accumula-
tion is:
hit = βR
i
thit−1 (2.126)
Next define the after tax individual labour income, as follows:
yit = f˜h(k˜t)hit ⇒ (2.127)
yit = f˜h(kss)hit (2.128)
hence, the log difference of labour income, will be equal to:
log(yit+1)− log(yit) = log(f˜h(kss)) + log(hit)− log(f˜h(kss)) + log(hit−1) (2.129)
= log(hit)− log(hit−1) (2.130)
= log(β) + log(Rxit) (2.131)
≈ log(β) + rk + θ[rh − rk + ηi] (2.132)
= β0 + θη
i︸︷︷︸
ei
(2.133)
and we can get:
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Var(∆ log(yit)) ≡ σ2y = θ2hσ2 ⇒ (2.134)
σy = θ
hσ (2.135)
σy = (
1
1 + k˜ + b˜
)σ (2.136)
σy is the standard deviation of labour income that can be matched from the
data. According to Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) the permanent component of the income
process conditional to aggregate shocks has a standard deviation σy ≡ E[yit+1yit |St] = 0.19,
while Storesletten et al. (2007) find σy = 0.25. We choose a compromise between the
two by setting σy = 0.215.
We next calibrate, the discount factor β to match the average consumption
growth, Ct+1Ct = Et[
cit+1
cit
] = βEt[Rxit+1 ] which in our case is equal to the growth rate of
the economy. In US data the average annual rate of growth for output, 1.6%, thus in
our steady state we set 1 + g = 1.016, which implies that β = 1.016Rx . Along the balanced
growth we follow Gottardi et al. (2014b) and assume τw = τk = τ . Moreover as in Chari
et al. (1994) we choose GtYt = 0.18,
Kt−1
Yt
= 2.71, Bt−1Yt =
Bt
Yt+1
= 0.51 ⇒ b˜ = 0.51Ak˜α.
These numbers in the balanced growth path can pin down taxes, τk = τw = 0.196. The
normalization for TFP is obtained by matching the saving rate, sx, in the US economy
(defined as the investment, Ik of physical capital to output) which is 0.25. Using the
law of motion for capital accumulation A =
(
g+δk
sx
)
k˜1−α. Solving the system the values
obtained, are β = 0.9458, τw = τk = 0.196, A¯ = 0.36 and σ = 0.5384. The remaining
parameters are chosen according to the RBC literature and in particular σe = 0.01,
ρ = 0.95 and δ = 0.06 (From Krebs (2003b)).
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2.8.6 List of Figures
Figure 2.4: Simulated Series Benchmark case
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Figure 2.5: Histograms for Taxes
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2.8.7 Definitions and Notation
W˜τwt ≡ Et
[
∂ logRxit+1
∂τwt+1
]
mit+1 ≡ R−1ixt+1
m∗it+1 ≡
R−1ixt+1
Et[R
−1
ixt+1
]
P˜Ht+1 ≡ (1− τwt+1)Fh(θkt+1, θht+1)− (1− τkt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1) + ηit+1
P˜Kt+1 ≡ 1 + (1− τwt+1)Fk(θkt+1, θht+1)− δ −Rft
M1 ≡
(
mit+1 × P˜Ht+1
)
M2 ≡
(
mit+1 × P˜kt+1
)
Rxt ≡ Et−1[Rxit ]
Rxt+1 ≡ Et[Rxit+1 ]
M3 ≡
(
Rft−1φt + gt − τkt Fkθkt − τwt FHθht − φt+1βRxt
)
M3t+1 ≡
(
Rft φt+1 + gt+1 − τkt+1Fkt+1θkt+1 − τwt+1FHt+1θht+1 − φt+2βRxt+1
)
DSF t+1 ≡ R−2ixt+1 × P˜Ht+1
DSF2t+1 ≡ R−2ixt+1 × P˜Kt+1
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Block 1
∂M1
∂θkt+1
≡ R−1ixt+1
[
(1− τwt+1) FHK︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−FKKθ
k
t+1
θht+1
−(1− τkt+1) FKK︸ ︷︷ ︸
−FK(1−α)(θkt+1)−1
]
−DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
= R−1ixt+1
[
(1− τwt+1)(θht+1)−1 + (1− τkt+1)(θkt+1)−1
]
(1− α)Fk −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
∂M1
∂θht+1
≡ R−1ixt+1
[
(1− τwt+1) FHH︸ ︷︷ ︸
−αFH(θht+1)−1
−(1− τkt+1) FKH︸ ︷︷ ︸
−FHHθ
h
t+1
θkt+1
]
−DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
≡ −R−1ixt+1
[
(1− τwt+1)(θht+1)−1 + (1− τkt+1)(θkt+1)−1
]
αFH −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
∂M1
∂τkt+1
≡ R−1ixt+1FK −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
∂M1
∂τht+1
≡ −R−1ixt+1FH −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂τht+1
∂M1
∂φt+1
≡ −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂φt+1
∂M1
∂Rft
≡ −DSF t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂Rft
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Block 2
∂M2
∂θkt+1
≡ R−1ixt+1(1− τkt+1)FKK −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
= −R−1ixt+1(1− τkt+1)FK(1− α)(θkt+1)−1 −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
∂M2
∂θht+1
≡ R−1ixt+1(1− τkt+1)FKH −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
= R−1ixt+1(1− τkt+1)FK(1− α)(θht+1)−1 −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
∂M2
∂τkt+1
≡ −R−1ixt+1FK −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
∂M2
∂τht+1
≡ −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂τht+1
∂M2
∂φt+1
≡ −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂φt+1
∂M2
∂Rft
≡ −DSF2t+1
∂Rixt+1
∂Rft
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Block 3
∂M3
∂θkt+1
≡ −τkt [FKKθkt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
FK(α−1)
+FK ]− τwt FHKθht+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−FKKθk
−φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
]
= − [τwt+1(1− α) + τkt+1α]︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2
FK − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
]
∂M3
∂θht+1
≡ −τwt [FHHθht+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−αFH
+FH ]− τkt FKHθkt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−FHHθh
−φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
]
= −[τwt+1(1− α) + τkt+1α]FH − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
]
∂M3
∂τkt+1
≡ −FKθkt+1 − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
]
∂M3
∂τht+1
≡ −FHθht+1 − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂τwt+1
]
∂M3
∂φt+1
≡ Rft − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂φt+1
]
∂M3
∂Rft
≡ φt+1 − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂Rft
]
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∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
≡ 1 + (1− τkt+1)Fk − δ + (1− τkt+1) θkt+1FKK︸ ︷︷ ︸
FK(α−1)
+(1− τwt+1) θht+1 FHK︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FKH︸ ︷︷ ︸
−FKKθk
= 1− δ + (1− τkt+1)Fk + (1− τkt+1)Fk(α− 1)− (1− τwt+1)Fk(α− 1)
= 1− δ +
[
(1− τkt+1)α+ (1− τwt+1)(1− α)
]
Fk
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
≡ 1 + (1− τwt+1)FH − δ + ηit+1 + (1− τkt+1)FKHθkt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
αFH
+(1− τwt+1)FHHθht+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−αFH
= 1− δ + ηit+1 +
[
(1− τkt+1)α+ (1− τwt+1)(1− α)
]
FH
∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
≡ −FKθkt+1
∂Rixt+1
∂τht+1
≡ −FHθht+1
∂Rixt+1
∂φt+1
≡ Rft
∂Rixt+1
∂Rft
≡ φt+1
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∂M1
∂θht+1
− ∂M1
∂θkt+1
= −R−1ixt+1FK(1− α)(k˜t+1 + 1)τ1
−DSF t+1
(
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
)
∂M2
∂θht+1
− ∂M2
∂θkt+1
=
R−1ixt+1FK(1− α)[(θkt+1)−1 + (θht+1)−1]
−DSF2t+1
(
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
)
∂M3
∂θht+1
− ∂M3
∂θkt+1
= τ2
(
1− (1− α)k˜t+1
α
)
FK
− φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
]
∂M1
∂τwt+1
− ∂M1
∂τkt+1
=
−R−1ixt+1FK
(
1 +
(1− α)k˜t+1
α
)
−
DSF t+1
(
∂Rixt+1
∂τwt+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
)
∂M2
∂τwt+1
− ∂M2
∂τkt+1
= R−1ixt+1FK −DSF2t+1
(
∂Rixt+1
∂τwt+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
)
∂M3
∂τwt+1
− ∂M3
∂τkt+1
= −FHθ
h
t+1
1− α − φt+2βEt
[
∂Rixt+1
∂τwt+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
]
∂Rixt+1
∂θht+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂θkt+1
= ηit+1 + τ2
(
(1− α)k˜t+1
α
− 1
)
FK
∂Rixt+1
∂τwt+1
− ∂Rixt+1
∂τkt+1
= −FHθ
h
t+1
1− α
∂ logRixt+1
∂τwt+1
− ∂ logRixt+1
∂τkt+1
= −R−1ixt+1FK
(
(1− α)k˜t+1
α
+ θkt+1
)
In some expressions we also used the property of Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, Fkt+1 k˜t+1 =
(
α
1−α
)
FHt+1 where k˜t+1 ≡ θt+1θht+1
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Multipliers: The case of
Greece
3.1 Introduction
Standard neoclassical growth models of fiscal policy usually predict private consumption
and real wages to fall, output and labour supply to increase and investment can take
either sign depending on the persistence of the fiscal shock. In contrast New Keynesian
models are able to generate an increase in real wages and private consumption, an
otherwise formidable challenge for RBC models. Although, those differences should
be thought as of short-run, in the long run the qualitative features seem to be very
similar. On the empirical side, the dispute is also thriving providing support for either
paradigms. For a survey see Perotti (2007) who critically reviews the literature.
The main purpose of this chapter is to address the case of Greece and implement
some empirical estimates of the tax and spending multipliers. Guided by the empirical
results, someone can also deduce at which side of the literature the Greek economy
possibly falls. Moreover, is a natural first step for analysing the effects of fiscal consoli-
dations, and the short to long-run effects that a fiscal adjustment can bring on growth,
fiscal sustainability and fiscal solvency. However and after being data constrained, the
main focus will be reserved for the effects on national output. To best of our knowledge
this study is the first application of the structural VAR to Greece.
The recent financial crisis and its conversion to a debt crisis within the Eurozone,
resurrected a widespread interest on fiscal policy. The interest was greatly extended on
the empirical side for its obvious policy implications, while the ongoing Greek Great
Depression feeds an equal academic interest on its own. From the point of view of
Greece, the empirical challenges faced were manifold while the implications for policy
analysis become more relevant than ever before. As such, the fundamental intention of
this research is to advance the debate over the empirical fiscal policy and draw some
relevant to Greece policy conclusions.
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3.2 Literature Review
Studies on fiscal policy for Greece are limited to a few applications of the neoclassi-
cal growth model. A leading example is Papageorgiou (2012). In his study, simulation
results do not report the size fiscal multipliers with respect to output, although is implic-
itly assumed to be less than one in absolute value. Given the lack of available literature
for Greece which can be directly comparable with this research it could be useful to
refer to other studies and leading research on empirical fiscal policy.
As mentioned above, the disagreement between the RBC and New Keynesian
predictions subsequently led to a voluminous, but interesting, literature on empirical
fiscal policy. A reflection on the different empirical methodologies, include among others,
the pioneer works of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) with their dummy variable approach,
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) with their SVAR approach, while more recently Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) with their sign restriction approach, all of which constitute classic
references on the fiscal policy empirical methodologies. Moreover, the narrative approach
of Romer and Romer (2010) advanced the debate over the size of tax multipliers by
providing support of large in size tax multipliers. The first study, gives support to the
RBC predictions while the SVAR approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is more
favourable to the New Keynesian paradigm. On the other hand, Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) circumvents some of the limitations of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) methodology
and highlights the significance of tax rebates. The merits and distinct features of the
different methodologies are unified and critically assessed by Caldara and Kamps (2008)
3.3 The SVAR methodology and the Econometric Model
The empirically challenging task for assessing the effects of fiscal policy on the economy,
lies on the identification of exogenous fiscal shocks. In other words, the difficulty lies
in finding directly observable responses of fiscal variables that can be characterized as
exogenous which then can constitute the basis for analysing the effects on the economy.
Loosely, speaking the curious task is to demonstrate discretionary changes in spending
or taxes.
After Sim’s pioneering article on VARs, fiscal shocks where ‘mechanically’ con-
structed utilizing a Cholesky decomposition 1. In principle, this is what the SVAR
approach of Blanchard and Perotti does, although under more plausible strategy than
an atheoretic Cholesky decomposition2.
In fact, the distinctive feature of the VARs against the other approaches is that
deduces the fiscal shocks from the data, in contrast with the narrative or dummy variable
approaches which regard specific external data as exogenous. In the language of Ramey
and Shapiro, military build-ups are the identified data - ‘events’ - of exogenous fiscal
shocks. In contrast, in Romer and Romer (2010) data is collected from Presidential
1See for instance Fata´s and Mihov (2001)
2In the empirical fiscal policy literature, VARs that use the Cholesky decomposition as a basis of
the identification problem is usually referred as the “Recursive approach”.
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speeches and congressional reports that are reasoning the scope of tax changes. Full
explanations on the merits and disadvantages of each approach is out of the scope of
this paper3.
Apparently, the main need to identify exogenous movements of fiscal variables
stems from the influence that automatic stabilizers can exert over the business cycle on
public finances or endogenous policy responses from the government. Indeed, the process
of identification aims at isolating this effect from changes in the fiscal variables which
could be assumed as independent to the cycle. The econometrician ought to disentangle
these effects, otherwise he risks losing the true causation between fiscal variables and
output. In this study we employ the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti. We ruled
out the dummy or narrative approach on the basis of data availability, while Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) method imposes ad hoc sign restrictions on impulse functions, a feature
that might be too restrictive for Greece given that output responses might positive after
a tax shock and negative after a government shock for economies carrying high debt or
high deficits (See, for example Ilzetzki et al. (2011).)
3.3.1 The Blanchard-Perotti Approach
Our benchmark econometric model follows BP specification of three variables (n = 3)
using taxes, government spending and output as the variables in the VAR system. In
other words, we decompose the budget constraint of the government in its broadest
sense, having public spending on the one side and tax revenues on the other side.
For government spending we use total government consumption of goods and
services. For taxes, we use total tax revenues net of transfer and interest payments
(See Appendix for further details.) Although, marginal tax rates would have being the
ideal instrument to test our question, time-series data for such fiscal variables - to the
best of our knowledge - do not exist for Greece. Nevertheless, in our identification
problem and as we will later explain, the tax elasticities used to identify fiscal shocks
they implicitly contain the effects of marginal tax rates through the constructed estimate
of the aggregate tax elasticity (See also the discussion in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)).
Also, and because the identification strategy relies on quarterly data, inclusion
of more macroeconomic variables in the system - for the relatively short sample period -
might bias our estimates. Therefore, we chose to take a basic analysis and use only three
variables with the sole aim to first study the effectiveness of fiscal policy in general. That
is, the three variable approach tries to answer the general question of which between
the two fiscal variables - government spending in general and taxes - have the greatest
impact on output. This type of analyses compares against an alternative - though
equally important - approach in studying the impact of specific fiscal plans. However,
the former approach, and although general enough, is a natural first step in assessing
the effectiveness of fiscal policy - especially if one considers the lack in consensus of the
theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy.
3The interested reader can advice Kilian (2011) and Caldara and Kamps (2008)
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Xt = c+ Φ(L)Xt−τ + ut (3.1)
where
 Xt = (τt, gt, yt) is the vector of endogenous variables.
 c is the constant term.
 Φ(L) is an 3 × 3 matrix of the lag polynomial having as elements the estimated
coefficients of the lagged variables.
 And finally ut = (u
τ
t , u
g
t , u
y
t ) represent the reduced form residuals vector
More specifically, τt represents the log of real net revenues per capita, gt repre-
sents the log of real net government expenses per capita, and yt the log of real output
per capita4.
3.3.2 The Identification Problem
Estimating (3.1) will generate a variance - covariance matrix (Σ = E(utu
′
t)) of residuals
that is not diagonal, implying that the reduced form residuals are correlated with each
other. This undesirable feature restricts any identification, since for example a shock (or
impulse) of one of the fiscal variables will have a direct effect on the other. The target is
to obtain orthogonal to each other shocks. From the econometrics point of view this is
equivalent of orthogonalizing the variance - covariance matrix. In practise, the target is
to find a relationship between the structural errors and the reduced form residuals. To
get such a relationship, if someone pre-multiplies (3.1) with a matrix A of n×n obtains
the structural form of the system:
AXt = Ac+AΦ(L)Xt−1 +Aut (3.2)
AXt = c
∗ + Φ∗(L)Xt−1 +Bet (3.3)
where AΦ = Φ∗, Ac = c∗ and Aut = Bet with et = (eτt , e
g
t , e
y
t ). The last of this
equation lies at the heart of the identification problem and is usually referred as the
AB model. In simple terms, what essentially means is to find matrices A and B such as
to be able to establish the relationship between the reduced form residuals, ut and the
structural ones, et and therefore recover the second from the first.
The AB model
For our case the AB model in matrix form can be written as:
4For the construction of data, see Appendix
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a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a23 a33

u
τ
t
ugt
uyt
 =
b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b23
b31 b23 b33

e
τ
t
egt
eyt

Now in principle to solve the system of the unknown parameters, it is required
n2−n
2 number of restrictions to exactly identify the system, given that we normalize
to unity the diagonal elements of B matrix. In our case this implies that we need at
least 3 restrictions to impose on the system. The strategy of BP approach is to impose
such restrictions by looking at institutional information and make specific assumptions
regarding some parameters. To make the point more clear rewrite the AB model with
the diagonals normalized to unity and a12 = a21 = b13 = b23 = b31 = b32 = 0 since we
wish the cov(uτt , u
g
t ) = 0. Following BP we ultimately get the following AB model 1 0 −a130 1 −a23
−a31 −a23 1

 u
τ
t
ugt
uyt
 =
 1 b12 0b21 1 0
0 0 1

 e
τ
t
egt
eyt

The above matrix form, and especially the minus signs, comes from the equivalent
relationship of ut = A
−1Bet and the assumed BP reduced-form errors relationship with
the structural errors of the following type:
uτt = a13u
y
t + b12e
g
t + e
τ
t (3.4)
ugt = a23u
y
t + b22e
t
t + e
g
t (3.5)
uyt = a31u
τ
t + a32u
g
t + e
y
t (3.6)
Equation (3.4) says that any unexpected movements in revenues (taxes) can be at-
tributed into three factors. First, due to unexpected movements in output or if you
prefer the response of the automatic stabilizers, second due to unexpected but exoge-
nous movements in government spending (structural shocks in spending) and finally
due to unexpected structural shocks to taxes. Equation (3.5) and (3.6) have similar
interpretations.
The fundamental innovation of the BP methodology is to use institutional and
extraneous information on the tax and transfer system so as to impose the three addi-
tional restrictions that needed. This is achieved by constructing the value for a13 and
imposing it as a restriction in the above system. In our sample the estimate for this par-
ticular value was 2.435. The second, comes from the assumption that within a quarter
implementation and decision lags on the part of the government eliminates any discre-
tionary action in this particular quarter. The plausibility of this assumption, lies on the
intuitive observation of public governance where a government in order to respond and
5See appendix for the details
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realize the shock, either needs to collect information (akin to the assumption of imper-
fect knowledge) or the legislation that is needed for a policy to be implemented requires
time, possibly of more than a quarter (legislative rigidities). In this sense, quarterly data
becomes crucial for making the particular assumption. For instance, with annual data,
a government certainly has the time and speed to take discretionary actions. Accord-
ingly, the parameter that captures such channel goes to zero, i.e. a2,3 = 0. Finally the
third restriction comes from the assumption on ‘policy ranking’ of the fiscal variables.
For example, do we suppose that authorities first observe the tax revenues and then
‘announce’ their spending decisions, or is exactly the opposite? On this, we follow BP
and assume that taxes come first, which is equivalent of imposing the restriction on b12
to be zero6.
uτt = 2.43u
y
t + e
τ
t (3.7)
ugt = b22e
τ
t + e
g
t (3.8)
uyt = a31u
τ
t + a32u
g
t + u
y
t (3.9)
These three additional assumptions completes the process of identification, whereas
the rest of the parameters are left unrestricted and following BP are estimated according
to the following steps.
First, we compute the cyclically adjusted taxes and spendings. In particular, we
have
uτtCA = u
τ
t − 2.43uyt = eτt
ugtCA = u
g
t − a23uyt = ugt = b22eτt + egt
Next, we regress uτtCA on u
g
tCA
estimate b22 and extract the residuals of the regression,
which are equal to egt and extract the e
x
t residuals. Therefore, the system is exactly iden-
tified and can recover the variance-covariance matrix of the structural errors. Moreover,
these estimates characterize the contemporaneous - within the quarter- effects of shocks
to our endogenous variables. Then, after the decomposition of structural shocks we
can estimate the impulse response functions and trace the short-run or long-run fiscal
multipliers.
3.4 Model Specification
In addition to the model specification outlined in the previous section, we decided to
include quarterly dummies, mainly to account for the seasonal collection of tax receipts,
and two distinct dummies to capture the effects of the financial crisis and the 2008-
2009 jump in spending, respectively. The first dummy -for short the ‘crisis dummy’-
takes the values of 1 from 2010q1-2012q1 and zero everywhere else, while the second -
for short the ‘spending dummy’ - is switching on between 2008q4-2009q3. Figure 3.8
6Results do not change if the opposite holds. Indeed, BP also found that their own result were
robust to this assumption
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in the Appendix clearly depicts the structural break from the crisis, and the jump in
government expenses that occurred prior to the 2009 elections.
In the regression we also added a linear trend and estimated a VAR of order
one. In choosing the lag order, we balanced between the suggestions of lag tests, the
VAR stability condition, as well as we tried to save on data observations. In practice,
it turned out that our VAR was extremely sensitive to different lag orders, therefore we
decided to use the most consistent among all lag tests criteria, which in our case was
the SIC test indicating a lag order one7. The other available tests, were either providing
conflicting results or were not consistent. In addition, for a lag order higher than 5 the
system found to be unstable. Finally, the tables below report the estimations that are
based on the levels of the data.8.
3.5 Results and Analysis
Figure 3.1: Contemporaneous Multipliers
Figure (3.1) above reports our estimates for the contemporaneous multipliers in
each quarter9. The estimated tax multiplier shows that a Euro increase in net taxes
drops economic activity by 0.36 cents, while a Euro increase in spending increases output
by 1.73 Euros. Interestingly, both estimates have their expected sign, invalidating the
theory of expansionary fiscal consolidations. Our results, also show that the spending
multiplier, is larger in absolute value than the tax multiplier which is consistent with
the Keynesian model. The size of the tax multiplier, however, is lower than one but
consistent with a variety of other studies10. The spendings multiplier on the other hand,
and in line with the Keynesian view, was found to be larger than one. This places Greece
as the country with the second largest government spending multiplier behind France
(See Table 3.2 )
Table (3.2), in particular, summarizes some empirical results found in the lit-
erature for other EU countries. From this table, the picture that emerges shows that
the spending multiplier for Greece is well above the EU average, in contrast with the
7Ilzetzki et al. (2011) also found that for highly indebted countries the lag order criteria to be 1.
8We also, conducted the estimations based on first-differences and on de-trended data using HP
filter to account for the non-stationarity. The results, showed only minor changes in the magnitudes. In
order to save data observations and keep measurement errors into minimum we decided to rely on the
levels
9Estimating the original coefficients obviously have the interpretation of elasticities. To convert to
a unit change, here Euro change, we simply used the formula of elasticity, i.e e =
ϑy
ϑx
x
y
⇒ ϑy
ϑx
= e× x
y
where
x
y
is the point mean
10See a summary table of various research in Figure 3.11
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal Multipliers for EU countries: Summary of Figures (3.10) and (3.11)
tax multiplier which is within the EU average. Moreover, while the tax multiplier is
similar to the one found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (i.e. -0.46 to -0.36 in their
paper), the spending multiplier is almost three times larger. However, this result is con-
sistent with other empirical studies, such as Ilzetzki et al. (2011) that account for the
exchange rate regimes, open economy issues and the level of public debt. Meanwhile,
and in a study that received widespread media attention, Blanchard and Leigh (2013)
documented that fiscal multipliers might have being underestimated in the initial phase
of the Greek crisis11, a statement which is in line with our findings.
Figure 3.3: Short-run Multipliers
Turning on the dynamic responses, Figure (3.3) summarizes the on average dy-
namic effects of shocks in spendings and taxes on economic activity. In particular, it
summarizes a permanent but unexpected unit shock, equivalent to a Euro increase in
taxes (first row) and spendings (second row), and the equivalent per Euro response of
output. Together with Figure (3.6) in the Appendix, the diagrams reveal that fiscal
shocks have only short-lived influence on GDP, persisting in most of the cases for 4
quarters with the exception of the effects of spendings where the effects last for around
2 years. Typically, the effect on output is quite large on impact following a government
11The Troika program in performing some of its forecasts, assumed that government spending mul-
tiplier was around 0.50.
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spendings shock but it declines quickly. In contrast, a tax shock is significant for one
year only and low in magnitude. Overall, the main conclusion that emerges is that
spendings channel is more potent relative to a tax rebate in stimulating output in the
short-run.
To assess this point further, figure (3.4) below shows the cumulative fiscal multi-
pliers. A cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio of the cumulative change in GDP
to cumulative change in fiscal variables, i.e
ΣTt=0∆yt
ΣTt=0∆gt
and as long as T → ∞ it reverts
the Long-run multiplier. This measurement might be a better indicator in assessing any
governmental stimulus for the reason that it contains the lagged responses and therefore
can account for the diffusion of stimulus over time.
Figure 3.4: Cumulative Multipliers
From the above figure it becomes more than evident that government spendings
is more effective in simulating output. The cumulative multipliers are quite large and
always statistically significant in the medium run, in contrast with the tax cumulative
multipliers which again have lower impact on output than spendings, decline over time
and are always statistically insignificant. It appears, that the spendings instrument
has ample effects on output with quite large relative to the literature multiplier. So, for
instance in the medium run a multiplier of 2.20 indicates that output more than doubled
its size relative to the increase in government spendings. An almost identical response
found in Italy by Giordano et al. (2008), a country of similar fiscal culture as in Greece.
It is noteworthy that the multiplier is constantly increases over time and stabilizes only
after 6 years - hence, the 2.23 estimate (See Appendix mid graph of third row of Figure
(3.7)) can also be thought as the long-run multiplier for Greece.
The rest of the impulse responses in figure (3.6) depict a negligible short run
effect on the remaining variables. Interestingly, taxes are not persistent on its own
shock and seems to have some minor but positive influence on spendings. In contrast
spendings shocks seem very persistent featuring somehow a well known behaviour of the
Greek public finances, although for our sample this can be explained by the increase
in public infrastructure and investments (e.g. for Olympic Games). Also is in line
with the original BP study for US or with (Giordano et al. (2007), p.575) for Italy.
Moreover, as Burriel et al. (2009) claim military expenses can also affect the degree
of persistence. The authors for instance, once they re-estimate the US model net of
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military purchases the degree of persistence fell significantly. For Greece is it a well
known fact that has the highest military expenses to GDP ratio among the EU countries.
This might explain the differences in the degree of persistence of the spendings shocks
in Greece and the rest of EU countries (See Boussard et al. (2012) or Burriel et al.
(2009)). Altogether, If one combines this with the nullified effects from and on taxes,
it approximates reasonably well some of the pathologies of the Greek economy on the
sustainability of public finances12.
3.6 Determining the size of Government Spending Multi-
plier
To determine the size of spendings multipliers and provide some possible explanations
for its magnitude, we necessary have to take into account the sample period in which
this study focused on.
First, from 1999 until 2002 the final stage of the Euro entrance adjustment oc-
curred, where prior to Euro entrance a prolonged period of some fiscal retrenchment
and an initial currency devaluation followed by a specific peg of Drachma on Euro took
place. Part of this period is covered by our 1999q1-2001q4 observations (22% of the to-
tal observations). Next, the Euro-euphoria phase and the 2004 Olympic games had the
lions share on the 5% average annual growth (highest in EU) between 2002-2008 period.
Together with the aforementioned spendings bonanza of 2009 prior to elections, it facili-
tates a period of high government spendings, high private consumption, easy credit and
clearly a regime shift in expectations. This sustained period of high economic growth
lies at the core of our sample accounting for nearly 60 % of our data. In addition, the
global environment accommodated perfectly the reception of Euro with a decrease in
risk premia and interest rates, (See Burriel et al. (2009)). Thereafter, the effects of the
global financial and the Greek debt crisis start to appear (approximately equal to 17 %
of our data).
Overall the previous paragraph lines point out that any off setting mechanism
of fiscal expansions probably were not at work. Indeed, for Greece a triplet of major
off-setting mechanisms did not operate. First, possibly no crowding out of investment
might have occurred due to a decrease in risk premia and interest rates13. Also, no
monetary policy could accommodate any radical expansion in the economy neither ex-
change rates could adjust for the inflows or outflows of capital. From this point of view,
it resembles a textbook Mundell-Fleming model of fixed exchange rates, which predicts
strong output effects from changes in government expenditures. Finally, tax revenues
were not responding neither to a government expenditure shock nor to the increase in
GDP. Putting all these together, and in combination with the persistence of the govern-
12Cointegration tests between taxes and spendings (an implicit test for the sustainability of public
finances) confirmed that there is no cointegrated relationship between these two variables. This implies
that spendings and revenues were not co-moving during the particular period
13We will address this in the feature
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ment expenses14, the insignificance of tax shocks and the ‘catch up’ effect on growth -
which implies that the economy was possibly not at full employment - then we view out
results as reasonable first approximation.
Furthermore our findings, are consistent with a recent study by Ilzetzki et al.
(2011) who found that a) for high income countries government purchases persist, b)
fixed exchange rate regime have higher on average impact and long-run multipliers
(especially if monetary does not accommodate any response to output) and c) these
multipliers can increase in value the more closed the economy is - which, paradoxically,
is also the case of Greece(See Ilzetzki et al. (2011)).
Nevertheless, from the econometrics point of view the spendings multiplier might
be biased upwards for three main reasons. Aside the small sample bias, anticipated
effects that the BP approach cannot capture, might play some role. For instance, the
decisions for organizing the Olympic games was held in 1997. Agents knew that a major
boost of government spendings will occur in order to improve the current infrastructure
or invest in new one. Second, changes in expectations before and after the Euro entrance
could have made the agents ‘less Ricardian’. Third, and of particular importance for
Greece, any debt feedback is completely missing in our analysis. As pointed out by
Favero and Giavazzi (2011) debt dynamics are crucial for determining the size of fiscal
multipliers. Finally, our finding on the tax effects might be downwards biased mainly due
to enforceability problems on collecting tax revenues. Also, as advocated by Crichton
et al. (2012) a tax variable under the direct control of the government is better data for
empirical analysis. We intend in the future to address all those issues of fiscal foresight
and the presence of Ricardian agents more convincingly.
Finally, in comparing the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) with the
one in Alesina et al. (2015) which addresses a related though not identical question, there
are two main differences. First, Alesina et al. (2015) use a narrative method similar to
the one in Romer and Romer (2010), where their identification of shocks is based on
the information that the publicly available documents provide on the reasons for tax
changes. In contrast, the approach taken by the SVAR relies heavily on a mechanical
construction of the fiscal shocks, and on some a priori assumption that theory might
impose. Second, in their paper their focus is explicitly on fiscal consolidation episodes.
But this then, ignores by construction the Keynesian prescription of optimal policy and
says little about period of fiscal expansions. In addition, in their methodology is hard to
tackle the fiscal actions in neighbouring countries which in the context of their analysis
is likely to influence the design of optimal fiscal plans.
3.7 Conclusions
Obviously, the major constraint of this paper is the limited data availability for perform-
ing a VAR analysis in sufficient depth and scale. Nevertheless, to conclude this research
monograph on Greek fiscal policy we wrap up our main findings in Figure 3.5. During
14 Since government purchases are part of total GDP makes the second depend on the persistence of
the first
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Figure 3.5: Summary of Main Findings
the underlined sample government purchases were very potent on stimulating output,
not only in the short-run but also in the long-run. In absolute value, the spending mul-
tiplier is well above the tax multiplier suggesting some Keynesian effects on aggregate
demand. The dynamic response of output after a tax shock last for around one year in
contrast with a spending shock which lasts significantly more.
On the other hand, the size of spending multiplier is statistically significant and
above one even in the long-run making this type of fiscal instrument much more effective.
Although, the results are empirically likely and meaningful from the theoretical point of
view, are not easily exportable or allow any generalizations for two main reasons. First,
the results might not be robust due to the possible anticipated effects, and therefore the
results might be upward biased because of the non-inclusion of debt dynamics. Second,
external factors that accompany our data sample, and in particular the non-existence
of mechanisms that can off-set government spending shocks, might also have biased our
results upwards.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Data Appendix
All data except otherwise described are extracted from Eurostat, in quarterly govern-
ment finance statistics from the quarterly non-financial account for general government.
The available data sample covers 1999q1:2012q1 period.
Government Expenditures
Government spending = Total general government expenditures - total transfers
- interest payable
Total transfers = Social benefits + Subsidies (payable)
+ Capital transfers(payable) +Other current transfers(payable)+Social transfers in kind
BP regard transfers as negative taxes. Moreover, someone can claim that trans-
fers only serve distributional concerns and have zero net impact. In addition particular
transfers, like unemployment benefits co-move with the business cycle, as such eliminat-
ing this effect can also reduce the influence of fluctuations. On the other hand, interest
rate payments are excluded because it is assumed that are largely out of government’s
control. See Giordano et al. (2007, p. 566-567)
Net Taxes
Government revenues = Current taxes on income and wealth + Taxes on im-
ports and production(indirect taxes) + social contributions (receivable) + capital taxes
receivable - total transfers
Output
Gross National Product at current market prices (in Euros). Data prior to 2000
was not available from Eurostat but provided by ELSTAT, with the note that the
methodologies differ after the national account revisions.
Consumer Price Index
Monthly series as provided from ELSTAT. I converted the monthly series to
quarterly using quarter averages
Population
Used the quarterly series for Population (in thousands) of 15 years and over by
employment status: 1998-2012, by quarter (Greece, total), Grand Total measurement,
as provided by ELSTAT.
Seasonal Adjustment
All series were seasonally adjusted by Eviews 7 routine TRAMO / SEATS
Construction of Elasticities
On the construction of the elasticity of net taxes to output,we followed Perotti
(2004) approach with the only exception that we did not updated the values of elastic-
ities but used instead the one calculated in den Noord (2000).Data for some particular
variables were not covering the sample under study. However, we found that the results
were insensitive to the choice of the elasticity of taxes w.r.t output.
3.8.2 Main figures and diagrams
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses to 1% standard deviation shock
Figure 3.7: Accumulated Impulse responses to 1 % standard deviation shock
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Figure 3.8: Government Spending over time as part of GDP
Figure 3.9: Net Tax revenues over time as part of GDP
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Figure 3.10: Estimated Expenditure Multipliers from Literature. Table from Boussard
et al (2012)
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Figure 3.11: Estimated Net Tax Multipliers from Literature. Table from Boussard et al
(2012)
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